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TAXATION WITHOUT REALIZATION:
A PROPOSAL FOR ACCRUAL TAXATION
DAVID J. SHAKOWt
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ACCRUAL TAXATION
For over ten years, debate about the proper structure of the tax
system in the United States has focused on the consumption tax as a
replacement for the income tax.' While consumption tax advocates ar-
gue for fundamental changes in the tax law,2 the most seriously consid-
ered changes in the income tax system are merely' incremental in
nature.3
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
A number of persons were of substantial assistance to me while I was preparing
this article. Dan Halperin originally interested me in the topic, and meticulously re-
viewed an early draft of the article. Hank Gutman has read and carefully commented
on more than one of the drafts. I also received helpful comments from Al Warren and
Regina Austin.
Alan Auerbach reviewed some of my conclusions from the economics perspective,
and gave me direction in those areas that were less familiar to me. Elizabeth Fogler of
the Flow of Funds Section of the Federal Reserve was a constant source of assistance in
interpreting the Flow of Funds data and related sources.
The analysis of data that served as the basis for the discussion of liquidity in
Section III of the paper was done for me by Michael Twisdale, who was serving as a
Winston Fellow of the Institute for Law and Economics of the University of Pennsyl-
vania. I also received assistance from Karen Wolfgang of the Class of 1985 at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. Financial assistance for this research was sup-
plied by the University of Pennsylvania Law School, which also provided me with a
personal computer that allowed me to make the computations that serve as the basis for
the three appendices.
I take full responsibility for the errors that the persons mentioned could not elimi-
nate from the paper.
I The stimulus for this debate came from Professor Andrews' article, A Consump-
tion-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974). Pro-
fessor Andrews, in turn, is trying to give a practical structure within the context of
United States taxation to the proposals that can be found in N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDI-
TURE TAX (1955).
2 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 1, at 1113; Bradford, The Case for a Personal
Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75 (J.
Pechman ed. 1980); INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM
OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as MEADE COMMITTEE REPORT]. For
a much earlier call for restructuring income tax systems, see N. KALDOR, supra note 1.
S See, e.g., Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the
Transition to a Flat Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 551-54 (1983) (arguing that a flat
tax proposal would be a logical extension of the 1982 minimum tax amendments);
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIM-
PLICITY (1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS] (focusing primarily on the
repeal of existing deductions).
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Even some supporters of a consumption tax might prefer to im-
prove the income tax. Professor Kaldor, an important early advocate of
the consumption tax, calls the consumption tax a "second best" solution
that should be used to supplement the income tax because the defects in
the income tax are not likely to be remedied.4 In his view, the introduc-
tion of a supplemental consumption tax would not remove the need to
remedy the "anomalies and distortions" of the current income tax.5
Professor Andrews, whose support for the consumption tax helped
popularize it in this country, presents the problems that arise under the
current income tax law very clearly:
If we think about the personal income tax in real terms,
as a tax on . . . consumption plus accumulation . . ., reflec-
tion will show that its worst inequity, distortion, and com-
plexity arise out of inconsistency in the treatment of accumu-
lation. . . . Savings out of ordinary income are fully taxed,
while accumulation of wealth in kind through appreciation
in value of property already owned is not reflected in current
taxable income. . . . [Moreover], [s]ome gains, though real-
ized, are unrecognized by reason of special statutory provi-
sions like those governing corporate reorganizations ...
The way out of these difficulties, according to the accre-
tion ideal, is to make taxable income provide a more compre-
hensive reflection of real accumulation . . . by including un-
realized changes in the value of property in taxable income.
Literal achievement of that goal would require that all assets
be taken into account at current fair market value at the end
of each accounting period. Although practical exigencies may
prevent comprehensive inclusion of unrealized appreciation,
improvement is thought to lie in that direction.6
Professor Andrews goes on to present his solution to those
problems: a consumption tax. He, like others who have joined this de-
bate before and after him, advances his solution without fully consider-
4 See Kaldor, Comments by Nicholas Kaldor, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: IN-
COME OR EXPENDITURE? 151, 153 (J. Pechman, ed. 1980) (commenting on Andrews,
A Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in id.).
Kaldor's fundamental problem with an income tax is that it taxes changes in the
value of assets that stem from changes in interest rates. See Kaldor, id.
To the extent these changes in interest rates reflect the effects of inflation, they can
be compensated for relatively easily under the proposal in this Article. See Part IV,
infra. To the extent the changes in value are due to other causes, this Article takes the
position that they ought to be taxed.
Kaldor, id., at 154.
S Andrews, supra note 1, at 1113, 1115-16.
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ing a proposal that has resurfaced periodically in the last fifty
years-an accrual tax system. Under such a system, taxpayers would
account annually for all changes in the value of their assets.7 An ac-
crual tax system offers many advantages; that is the reason the proposal
never dies.
Unfortunately, the accrual system has never attracted a large
group of adherents because its twin problems of valuation (How can all
assets be valued every year?)8 and liquidity (How can taxpayers pay
taxes if they do not sell their assets?) have never been solved.9 Even the
7 One major effect of an accrual system is to tax increases in the value of invest-
ment assets currently. For summaries of the arguments for and against the taxation of
gains on investment assets generally, see L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREAT-
MENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 83-108 (1951); Blum, A Handy Summary of
the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957).
8 Professor Bittker suggests that the complexities that would result from the elimi-
nation of the realization requirement (mainly in the increased cost of appraisal) would
probably not approach the cost of administering the realization requirement. Bittker,
Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 (1974); see also M.
DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 215 n.6 (1968)
(" '[T]here are an awful lot of assets that can be valued annually, and I am not sure
you should throw out the opportunity to do that just because others can't [be val-
ued].' ") (quoting from summary of conference floor discussion); Wetzler, Capital
Gains and Losses, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 115, 161 (J. Pechman ed.
1977) ("For some assets, such as publicly traded securities, the valuation objection is
surely weaker than for others, and it would seem worthwhile to consider whether the
liquidity objection is really significant enough to preclude accrual taxation where it is
administratively feasible."). Professor Shoup states that under a system of current ac-
crual of gains and losses "the simplification achieved for the income tax law as a whole
would of course be enormous." Shoup, The White Paper: Accrual Accounting for Cap-
ital Gains and Losses, 18 CAN. TAX J. 96, 97 (1970). Professor Shoup was director of
research for a study in 1937 by the Twentieth Century Fund that concluded that all
increases and decreases in values of capital assets should be recognized on an annual
basis. See TWENTIETH CENTURY TAX FUND, INC., FACING THE TAX PROBLEM 476-
84 (1937) [hereinafter cited as TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND]. The study's conclusion,
however, was subject to the rather significant caveat that the attendant administrative
problems must be solved. See id. at 490.
' Language in some early Supreme Court decisions suggests a third potential
problem: the constitutionality of an accrual tax system. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (Income is not taxable unless it is "a gain accruing to capi-
tal, not a growth or increment of value in the investment."); Gray v. Darlington, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 63, 66 (1872) ("Mere advance in value in no sense constitutes the
gains, profits, or income specified by the statute."), quoted with approval in Lynch v.
Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 230 (1918).
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court have led commentators to conclude
that the Constitution is probably not a serious impediment to an accrual system. See,
e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5.01, at 69 (4th ed. 1985); J.
SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 71 (1967); Bittker, Charitable Gifts
of Income and the Internal Revenue Code: Another View, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1375,
1380 (1952); Stone, Back to Fundamentals: Another Version of the Stock Dividend
Saga, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 898, 916-17 (1979); Surrey, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779,
791 (1941); see also Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4308 (1969) ("We conclude that it is within the
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few advocates of an accrual tax system have never considered systemati-
cally how the proposal might be implemented in the real world.
This Article develops a specific proposal for an accrual income tax
system that gives particular attention to the problems of valuation and
liquidity. Such a specific proposal for an accrual income tax system will
enable policymakers to determine whether an accrual tax system is a
reasonable path for fundamental tax reform.
The intellectual basis for accrual taxation is the Haig-Simons defi-
nition of income as the sum of consumption and the change in value of
property.10 Commentators often use this definition in analyzing and
evaluating proposals under an income tax."' Requiring taxpayers to ac-
crue changes in asset values would bring our tax system much closer to
one based on the Haig-Simons definition. In addition, the Haig-Simons
definition suggests that the distinction between capital gains and losses
and ordinary gains and losses should be eliminated. 2 As a tax system
nears the Haig-Simons ideal, its faults become those ascribed to an in-
come tax system generally.1 3 Compared to our current income tax sys-
tem, however, an accrual system would be more efficient, more equita-
ble, and, in significant ways, simpler.
An accrual tax system would be more efficient because the current
system's deviations from an ideal income tax encourage undesirable ec-
onomic activity. Under the current method of taxing gains only on sale,
taxpayers are "locked in" to appreciated assets, resulting in decreased
liquidity in the marketplace.1 4 In addition, the rules that provide
power of Congress to declare that an increase in value of assets . . .is rightfully sub-
ject to tax as income.") (quoting Robert K. Knight, General Counsel for the Treasury
Department). I have ignored the constitutional problem in this Article.
10 See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938), quoted in M.
GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 89 (1985) (successor edition); Haig, The Con-
cept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (1921), quoted in M. GRAETZ,
supra..
"I For use of the definition in basic studies of the income tax, see U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
BLUEPRINTS] (outlining a proposal for fundamental tax reform, but "not recom-
mend[ing] taxation of gains as accrued"); MEADE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 31-33; Shachar, The Importance of Considering Liabilities in Tax Transition, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1853 (1985). See generally Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax Base
As A Goal of Income Tax Reform, in A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? A
DEBATE 7-9 (1968) [hereinafter B. BITTKER] (noting the popularity of this definition
as a basis for a "'true' or rigorous comprehensive tax base").
12 See B. BITTKER, supra note 11, at 43.
13 For example, any income tax system will have to confront the broad problem of
defining income, see MEADE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 30, although some
of the problems of measuring income, such as determining the appropriate rate of de-
preciation and adjusting for inflation, can be avoided through alternatives such as a
consumption tax system. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 3.
"' See Wetzler, supra note 8, at 135 ("The lock-in effect of capital gains taxation
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favorable treatment for certain corporate reorganizations, but not for
other exchanges of corporate stock, encourage inefficient concentration
of corporate activities.
15
This argument does not deny that even an ideal income tax will
create economic inefficiencies; any tax but a lump sum tax will." By
coming closer to the ideal, however, an accrual system can reduce the
extent to which the income tax, in practice, has such undesirable
effects.
In addition to being more efficient, an accrual income tax system
would be more equitable than the current system. Fairness dictates that
a tax system not tax more severely someone who sells an appreciated
asset than someone who chooses to hold it. Fairness also dictates that
situations where tax liabilities depend on technicalities be minimized.
For example, the tax liability of someone who receives ITT stock in
exchange for an interest in the Hartford Insurance Company should
not depend on extraneous matters relating to ITT's prior dealings in
Hartford stock.17 Anomalies such as these disappear when the rules on
recognition, with their myriad exceptions and special cases, are
eliminated.
As for the goal of simplicity, it must be conceded that a proposal to
tax persons on increases and decreases in the value of assets is far from
an obvious choice for simplifying the tax law. Indeed, a collection of
comments on the possibility of adopting such a proposal reads like an
object lesson in unsimplifying the tax laws."8 On the other hand, those
refers to its tendency to cause investors to postpone sales of appreciated assets."). For a
discussion of the economic significance of the lock-in effect, see id. at 138-40.
15 See A. FELD, TAX POLICY AND CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 81-103 (1982).
Preliminary empirical studies suggest that the actual influence of tax treatment on cor-
porate concentration may be less significant than previous theoretical discussions sug-
gested. See M. Kramer, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Ungrateful Favored Child of
the Tax Laws 11 (May 9, 1985) [unpublished manuscript on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review].
18 See R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 157 (1959). A lump
sum tax is a tax that "meets the condition that the amount of tax does not depend upon
any variable in the system." Id. at 143. A "head tax," under which each taxpayer pays
the same amount to the government, is a common example. See id. at 142-43.
" See Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 861-62 (1st Cir. 1980) (tax-free
treatment of stock-for-stock exchange denied because requirement that eighty percent
control be obtained "solely" for voting stock not satisfied due to ITT's purchase of eight
percent of the outstanding shares of Hartford for cash two years before).
18 See, e.g., General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 285 (1973) (testimony of Professor Richard
Musgrave) ("Obviously, . . .taxation of all current but unrealized gains on an annual
accrual basis would be unmanageable."); Blum, supra note 7, at 254 ("While every so
often somebody proposes that unrealized capital gains (and losses) be taken into ac-
count in computing income, there has always been an overwhelming sentiment against
putting taxpayers and tax administrators to the additional work necessarily entailed.");
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who have favored exploring an accrual tax system have been impressed
by the amount of simplification that such a proposal, coupled with
elimination of the capital gain/ordinary income distinction, could pro-
duce. Professor Vickrey asserts that his proposal for lifetime averaging
of income, which shares the goal of reducing the significance of timing
issues under the income tax, would have eliminated about half of the
income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as it stood fifteen
years ago.19
The reason accrual taxation would simplify the tax system is
fairly apparent once one begins paging through the Code.20 All of the
provisions on ordinary gain and loss and on capital gain and loss would
vanish, as would virtually all of the provisions relating to corporation-
shareholder relationships.2 ' Moreover, if accrual taxation applies to all
assets (not just capital assets, for example), many details relating to
capitalization, depreciation, and depletion might also be eliminated.
MEADE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 129 ("Clearly the taxation of such
[accrued] holding gains could put heavy strains on the cash position of closely owned
businesses. . . . [Flor a wide range of assets this would be inordinately costly and
difficult to implement."); Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHIO
ST. L.J. 151, 181 (1964) ("The administrative difficulties in connection with such a
plan are so great that it is unlikely that Congress will ever adopt it."); Maguire, Book
Review, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 714 n.18 (1938) (reviewing TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, supra note 8) ("[Accrual taxation] might do a great deal to end unemployment,
but hardly qualifies as a practical method of administering an income tax."); Wetzler,
supra note 8, at 120 ("Completely eliminating deferral means taxing on accrual, which
must be ruled out because it would be extraordinarily difficult to value nonmarketable
assets every year in order to measure the accrued gain or loss."); see also Bradford,
supra note 2, at 83:
Though it might be possible to measure these accruals currently where
active markets exist, . . . such procedures have not interested practical
men (in part because they do not seem to consider genuine the wide
swings in wealth that these valuations imply). . . . The difficulty of ob-
taining annual valuations and the potential cash flow problems for taxpay-
ers with large accrued income but no cash income have generally led to the
acceptance . . . of a realization basis for capital gains accounting.
"9 See Vickrey, Tax Simplification Through Cumulative Averaging, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 736, 742-44 (1969). Professor Shoup reached a similar conclusion.
See Shoup, supra note 8, at 97.
20 Professor Shoup outlines some of the provisions that would be deleted or re-
duced through accrual accounting for capital gains and losses. See Shoup, supra note 8,
at 102. The Code provisions that could be eliminated or shortened by reducing the
significance of timing issues (also a focus of the present proposal) are outlined by Pro-
fessor Vickrey. See Vickrey, supra note 19, at 743-44 tables 1, 2.
21 Indeed, one could consider eliminating the corporate tax structure completely.
See infra text accompanying notes 77-95 (an accrual system would tax corporate share-
holders directly on changes in value of their stock). Eliminating the corporate tax was
part of a proposal advanced by the Twentieth Century Fund in 1937. See TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 483; see also Shoup, supra note 8, at 100 (discussing




Perhaps even more significantly, eliminating the realization require-
ment would sharply reduce the opportunities for tax planning in busi-
ness transactions, substantially simplifying the true costs of applying
the tax laws.
A review of a number of cases decided by the Tax Court provides
another useful measure of the extent to which the proposal developed
in this Article would simplify the Code. 2 Of the forty-six cases in vol-
ume 81 of the Tax Court Reporter that deal with substantive issues
under the income tax,23 the proposal would totally moot six,2 remove
substantial issues in three others,25 and reduce in importance the issues
in six others.2" Thus, under this proposal about 30% of the cases re-
ported in volume 81 that deal with substantive issues of income tax law
22 This method of sampling has been used before to measure simplification in the
area of complex transactions. See Hickman, Capital Gains and Simplification, in FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION 223, 234-35 (C. Gustafson ed. 1979).
23 There are 64 cases reported in volume 81. Nine involve the estate tax, and two
involve Social Security and self-employment taxes. Of the remaining 53 cases, seven are
procedural or administrative in nature.
24 These cases involved the distinction between capital gain and ordinary income,
see Foote v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 930 (1983), affd mem., 751 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.
1985); Georgia Int'l Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 166 (1983); like-kind
exchanges, see Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782 (1983), affd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th
Cir. 1985); Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767 (1983), affd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th
Cir. 1985); the year property was abandoned, see Daily v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 161
(1983), affd mere., 742 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1984); and LIFO inventories, see W.C. &
A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 619 (1983).
25 One involved the useful life of land, see Vecker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 983
(1983), affd, 766 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1985); one involved a sale, see Vaughn v. Com-
missioner, 81 T.C. 893 (1983), and the third involved the transfer of a debt instrument,
see American Air Filter Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 709 (1983).
26 One case involved the accumulated earnings tax, which may well be eliminated
under the proposal. See Rutter v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 937 (1983). Two involved
pension arrangements, which will have little or no tax advantage under the proposal.
See Anthes v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 1 (1983), affid mem., 740 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.
1984); Efco Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 976 (1983). Three others involved tax
shelters depending on accelerated deductions, which will be reduced or eliminated
under the proposal. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184
(1983), modified, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985); Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210
(1983); Elkins v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669 (1983). Two other cases that might have
their significance reduced under the proposal involved the taxation of life insurance
companies, which may be simplified once holders of life insurance are taxed directly.
See National States Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 325 (1983), af'd, 758 F.2d
1277 (8th Cir. 1985); Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 368 (1983), affd,
768 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1985); cf. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 268-71 (1984), reprinted in 53
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (extra edition) (CCH) 254-57 (Dec. 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as TREASURY PROPOSALS] (discussing proposed changes in the taxation of life insur-
ance companies in light of changes in the taxation of their products). Finally, two cases
reported in volume 81 involved the maximum tax, which the Code no longer includes.
See Van Kalker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 91 (1983), rev'd, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9,727 (7th Cir. 1984); Doty v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 652 (1983).
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would become moot or would be substantially reduced in their scope.2
As stated above, the two major obstacles to accrual taxation are the
difficulty of valuing assets on an annual basis and the liquidity
problems resulting from levying a substantial tax on persons who may
hold few liquid assets. This Article discusses the valuation problem in
Part II, which attempts to fit the accrual system to each category of
assets that taxpayers may own. The Article then considers the liquidity
problem in Part III by examining actual asset holdings of individuals.
Next, Part IV discusses another benefit that may result from going to
an accrual system: the ease of incorporating a full offset for inflation in
such a system. Finally, Part V addresses the transition problems that
might arise in switching from our current system to an accrual system.
II. THE VALUATION OF ASSETS UNDER AN ACCRUAL SYSTEM
An accrual tax system cannot succeed without a satisfactory
method of valuing assets. This section considers how to value the major
categories of assets.
At the outset, it should be recognized that the accrual system
would mitigate the .valuation problem in two ways. First, the expanded
tax base allows for a lowering of tax rates, thus reducing the tax effect
of each valuation. Second, a mistake in valuation in one year can be
largely offset by a later correct valuation. The net effect of an incorrect
valuation will be to shift income from one year to another.28
More importantly, in addressing the valuation problem, this pro-
posal aims for improvement, not perfection, of the tax system. If the
proposal abandons pure accrual in some cases, it should still be counted
as a success if it creates a better system than current law. Of course, to
justify a major change, the new system should be appreciably better
than current law.29 Accordingly, the new system will leave an imperfect
part of current law in place if it cannot be easily improved, as long as
changes incorporated into the new system do not magnify the current
imperfections. In particular, the proposal takes seriously the need to
make the system administratively feasible.
The basic outline of the proposal is as follows:
" Of course, some of the simplification thus achieved would be offset by an in-
crease in disputes over valuation.
28 For example, if a property is worth $100,000 in Year 1, $110,000 in Year 2,
and $120,0000 in Year 3, the effect of valuing it at $120,000 in Year 2, with correct
valuations in the other years, is to shift $10,000 of income from Year 3 to Year 2.
29 The Meade Committee noted that the existence of transition problems might
support the conclusion that "an old tax is a good tax." See MEADE COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 22-23.
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1. General Accrual Rule. Taxpayers will value all assets
and liabilities annually, recognizing gains and losses for tax
purposes regardless of realization.
2. Capital Gains. The tax system will draw no distinction
between capital gains and losses and other gains and losses.
3. Assets Excluded from Accrual Treatment. Recognition of
gain on the sale of personal residences and consumer
durables (including collectibles) and recognition of the gain
or loss on the sale of the stock of certain closely held corpo-
rations and other assets that are particularly hard to value
will be based on a modified version of the recognition rules
of current law. Recognized gains and losses on most such
assets, however, must be adjusted to take account of deferral.
4. Liabilities Excluded from Accrual Taxation. Increases
and decreases in the value of consumer debt (including home
mortgages) will be ignored.
5. Pension Funds. Pension funds will be taxed directly; no
attempt will be made to attribute the gains in a fund to par-
ticular taxpayers.
6. Business Assets. In applying accrual taxation to business
assets the system will in general use mechanical tests such as
those used now for depreciation. The system will tax in-
tangibles, such as good will, only on realization.
7. Bequeathed Assets. Gains and losses on all assets (includ-
ing those that are not normally valued annually under the
accrual system) will be recognized at death.
8. Liquidity Problems. Under restricted conditions, taxpayers
with liquidity problems could defer their tax payments.
Two of the rules above that are not central to the concerns of this
Article should be noted with a little more detail at this point. Abolish-
ing the distinction between ordinary income and capital gains is a com-
mon aspect of proposals for accrual taxation and for change in the in-
come tax system generally."0 Although abolishing this distinction would
certainly simplify the operation of the tax system, its effects are not
nearly as significant as a move to accrual taxation. For example, a re-
view of the cases in volume 81 of the Tax Court Reporter shows that
only two of the cases decided in that volume would be mooted if the
30 See, e.g., COMMISSION TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE
FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE 37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION TO REVISE];
H.R. REP. No. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1986) (Senate version of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, repealing deduction for a portion of long term capital gains).
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distinction were eliminated. 1 This contrasts with the four other cases
mooted by the accrual tax proposal, the three cases in which substantial
issues were eliminated, and the six cases in which the importance of
issues was substantially reduced.
3 2
A provision for gains at death is an appropriate aspect of an ac-
crual system. Most assets will be taxed on the basis of an annual valua-
tion, and there is little reason to exempt from income tax whatever gain
accrues in the year of death. The assets that are not included in the
normal accrual system are exempted because valuing them annually
would be too burdensome. However, Congress has been willing to re-
quire that all assets be valued for purposes of the estate tax. If this one-
time valuation can be tolerated for purposes of the estate tax, it should
be required for purposes of the income tax also. 33
A. Assets Excluded from the Annual Valuation Requirement
It should be conceded at the start that a practical system for ac-
crual taxation should not require valuation of every asset owned by
every taxpayer. Assets of small value, for example, are best left outside
a system of annual valuation if they are difficult to value. An advocate
of accrual taxation must therefore confront the question of how such
assets should be treated before considering how to value the various
categories of other assets.
A number of alternatives are available for assets that are impracti-
cal to value on an annual basis. First, the system can treat these assets
under the rules of current law, with gains and losses taken into account
only on recognition. Second, the system could require taxpayers to
value these assets less frequently than once a year. The system could
then require taxpayers either to pay tax on the measured gain or loss
or to adjust it for the period of deferral. Third, the government could
determine the average change in value of assets similar to these assets.
The system would then apply the average change to taxpayers' specific
assets and treat these adjustments like any changes in value under the
regular accrual system until such taxpayers made final adjustments
when they sold the assets. Finally, the system could treat these assets
under the recognition rules of current law but require adjustment of
31 See supra note 24.
32 See supra notes 24-26.
8 Of course, since many estates are currently exempt from the estate tax, this
proposal would increase the number of estates which must value assets. The point in
the text is not tlat the appraisal of assets will, in all cases, be made in any event for
purposes of the estate tax, but rather that valuing assets is considered an appropriate
activity for an estate.
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recognized gains-to account for the advantage of deferral-and adjust-
ment of recognized losses-to account for the disadvantage of deferral.
While it is not necessary to choose one method for all assets excluded
from normal accrual valuation, a single uniform exception would make
it easier for taxpayers to apply the system as a whole.
1. Current Law Treatment
If the tax law treats some assets under the current rules, while it
treats most others under the accrual system, taxpayers may be en-
couraged to invest inefficiently in assets receiving current law treatment
in order to continue to reap the benefits of deferral. 4 Thd seriousness
of this problem depends on the magnitude and substitutability of the
assets involved.3 5 In general, tax policymakers should be concerned
about distorting taxpayers' economic choices, and any decision to ex-
clude assets from the accrual system must address that concern.
2. Less Frequent Valuation
This alternative has been proposed in some earlier proposals for
accrual taxation."' Less frequent valuation reduces the problem of im-
properly inducing taxpayers to purchase assets excluded from the ac-
crual system. Nevertheless, it does not eliminate the problem com-
pletely. Moreover, if we have decided that a particular asset is too
difficult to value annually, it is presumably still quite burdensome to
value it every three or five years. If valuation will occur less frequently
than this, we might just as well wait for an actual disposition (or death)
to impose a tax.
3 Consider two assets in which a taxpayer can invest. The assets are identical
except for the fact that one is subject to accrual taxation and the other is taxed only on
realization. Assuming the taxpayer anticipates an increase in the value of the invest-
ment, the taxpayer will want to invest in the asset taxed on realization and thus post-
pone the payment of tax. Thus if an accrual system were adopted, but some assets were
left under the current system, the assets taxed on realization would become relatively
more attractive investments solely because of tax considerations.
11 This issue is discussed in Part D below with respect to principal residences. See
infra text accompanying note 126.
36 See, e.g., COMMISSION TO REVISE, supra note 30, at 38 (valuations of art
treasures and similar items might be made every ten years); Kelsey, Timing Considera-
tions in the Taxing of Capital Gains under the Tax Reform Proposals, in REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD TAX CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN TAX
FOUNDATION 74, 75 (1972) (referring to a Canadian Government proposal that would
have required stock to be valued every five years).
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3. Statistically Based Valuation
Under this approach, unless the taxpayer presents evidence of the
change in value of a specific asset, the system would presume that the
asset's value changed at the same rate as the values of similar assets.
For example, to determine the tax on an old master painting that need
not be valued annually, the taxpayer might apply an index published
by the Internal Revenue Service on the change in value of old master
paintings generally. If, in the current tax year, such paintings increased
in value by 15% on the average, the system would presume the tax-
payer's particular painting to have increased in value by 15% as well.
Significant practical problems argue against adopting this ap-
proach. First, the approach would require the IRS to develop the nec-
essary indices, unless others had already compiled them. More seri-
ously, it would require taxpayers to classify assets in order to know
which index applied. This could presage a set of problems like those
arising in connection with the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) sys-
tem, with its long tables of asset classes and different class lives.
3 7
While this method might work well for some narrowly drawn
classes of assets, it cannot be the preferred method for assets generally.
In effect, it applies an accrual tax system using average valuations,
with relatively little concern for the equity of applying it in a particular
case. While the opportunity for taxpayers to challenge the IRS's valua-
tion might moderate this characteristic, it would lead to a more com-
plex application than seems warranted by the problem.
4. Adjustment for Deferral of Gains and Losses
Finally, the system could require taxpayers to adjust their gains
and losses on recognition to compensate for deferral. Under a relatively
simple approach, the IRS could construct tables that would increase the
nominal gain or loss on an asset to reflect the interest the government
could have earned on an immediate tax on gains when they occurred
and the interest the taxpayer could have earned on the tax savings from
an immediate deduction of losses. Construction of these tables would
have to address the problems of how to allocate the total gain or loss
over the period during which a taxpayer holds the asset and which
interest rate(s) to use. Unless there were signs that it encouraged abuse,
I would favor a simple allocation of gain pro rata over the period the
property was held.3"
17 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 83-35, 1983-1 C.B. 745.
The application of a simple version of this rule can be illustrated with an ex-
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The taxpayer would multiply the adjusted gain or loss figure by
an appropriate tax rate to produce a tax liability in the year the gain or
loss is recognized. The tax rate might be something simple like the
taxpayer's marginal rate in the year of purchase or the year of sale.
Such a rule, however, could induce taxpayers to distort their economic
Ueh avior. For example, if the taxpayer anticipates selling absets at a
gain, and if the tax rate in the year of purchase applies, then the tax-
payer will attempt to plan purchases in years of low income. On the
other hand, if the tax rate in the year of sale applies (as under current
law), the taxpayer will attempt to plan sales in years of low income. An
alternative method would use an average rate based on the taxpayer's
various marginal rates during the period the asset was held. While this
method would reduce game-playing by taxpayers, it would require
more record-keeping. An even simpler rule would tax the gain at a
fixed rate, at or near the maximum marginal rate for individuals.
Adjusting gains and losses for deferral is the most attractive of the
four alternatives considered above because it allows for a relatively
mechanical approach to the taxation of assets excluded from the accrual
system without unduly inducing investment in such assets. I would al-
low a reconstructed loss to be used in the year of disposition, and would
tax the reconstructed gain at the rate of tax applied to the taxpayer in
the year of disposition.
Although this method attempts to capture the benefits of deferral,
it still does allow for game-playing by taxpayers who try to choose the
year in which to recognize gain or loss. Accordingly, we must not adopt
this method in too many situations. Moreover, if the potential for mis-
measurement of tax appears to be too great in practice, a taxpayer
ample. Suppose an asset is purchased in Year 1 and sold in Year 4 at a gain, and that
the gain is deemed to accrue on a straight-line basis over the four-year period (with a
full-year convention-an equal portion of the gain is assigned to each year if the asset
is held for any portion of the year), with interest accruing at an annual rate of 10%.
For each dollar of gain recognized after four years, $0.25 is deemed to accrue in each of
the four years. The $0.25 accrued in Year I will be increased by three years of 10%
compounded interest, the $0.25 from Year 2 will be increased by two years of interest,
and the $0.25 from Year 3 will be increased by 10%. (Because a single tax rate will be
applied to the adjusted gain, increasing the gain by an interest factor is equivalent to
increasing the tax liability by an interest factor.) Thus, each dollar of gain on an asset
held for four years is equivalent to $1.16 of adjusted gain (approximately $0.33 from
Year 1, $0.30 from Year 2, $0.28 from Year 3, and $0.25 from Year 4). The IRS could
tell taxpayers who sold assets excluded from the current accrual system after holding
them for four years to multiply the gain or loss by 1.16 to get the amount of gain or
loss to which the tax rate would then apply. For a more precise estimate of the benefits
of deferral, along with an adjustment for inflation, see MEADE COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 148-49. Because all reconstructions of this type are based on assump-
tions that will not apply to any particular case, I favor the relative simplicity of the
proposal in the text, which does not resort to divisions of logarithms for its explanation.
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should be required to use a tax rate from a year prior to sale if the rate
in the year of sale is not characteristic of the taxpayer's tax rate during
the holding period of the property sold.
The rules above, while based on recognition events, would still
permit the repeal of a number of nonrecognition rules in the Code: the
like-kind exchange rules, 9 the rules allowing corporations40 and part-
nerships4 to be formed tax-free, and the rules relating to tax-free cor-
porate reorganizations.
42
On the other hand, the rules of section 103343 allowing tax-free
repurchases in the case of casualty losses might be left in the Code if
policymakers agree that the occurrence of a disaster is not an apt time
for what the public will view as a tax detriment. In addition, the loss
disallowance rules of section 26744 should remain in effect as long as
the possibility of a collusive sale at a loss exists. Finally, restrictions on
the use of losses similar to those in section 121141 should be retained
for these assets; otherwise taxpayers will be encouraged to bunch losses
on such assets in years when other income is high.
B. Overview of Individually Held Assets
Before embarking on an analysis of how to treat individual catego-
ries of assets, one needs to identify the universe of assets held in the
United States and to determine the size of each category. Of particular
interest are the sizes of those categories of assets that must be treated
relatively imprecisely in an accrual system. Table 1 is based on data
compiled by the Federal Reserve Board on assets and liabilities of indi-
viduals at the end of 1984. The method used to construct the table is
discussed in Appendix A. The data include holdings in personal trusts,
and may incorporate some assets and liabilities of nonprofit entities.46
Others have compiled data for earlier years that provide more refined
39 I.R.C. § 1031 (1982 & West Supp. 1986). This rule could be repealed because
the proposed system eliminates most of the advantage of continuing an investment, so
that reinvestment in similar assets need no longer be favored.
40 Id. § 351 (1982 & West Supp. 1986). Once most assets are covered either by a
current accrual rule or a five year valuation rule, the protection afforded by this rule is
hardly needed to encourage incorporation.
41 Id. § 721 (1982). The reasons are similar to those related to section 351. See
supra note 40.
42 Id. §§ 354-368 (1982 & West Supp. 1986).
43 Id. § 1033 (1982).
44 Id. § 267 (1982 & West Supp. 1986).
45 Id. § 1211 (1982).
4' For a fuller discussion of the derivation of this table, see Appendix A; BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., BALANCE SHEETS FOR THE U.S. ECON-
OMY, 1945-1984 (1985) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS].
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estimates for certain categories of assets and liabilities. One major alter-
native study4 7 is summarized in Appendix A. It and other sources of
data are noted below in connection with each asset category.
Table 1
1984 Year-End Balance Sheet of Individuals in the U.S.
with Assets and Liabilities at Current Cost
Amount % of Total Avg. % of Total
Category ($million) 1984 1961-84
Assets
Tangible assets 7,658,379 53.6 51.54
Reproducible assets 5,023,590 35.1 35.65
Residential structures 2,919,506 20.4 20.25
Owner-occ. housing 2,415,156 16.9 16.33
Other 504,350 3.5 3.92
Nonres. plant & equip. 744,997 5.2 4.61
Inventories 123,626 0.9 1.45
Consumer durables 1,235,461 8.6 9.35
Land 2,634,789 18.4 15.89
Owner-occupied 1,117,551 7.8 5.90
Other 1,517,238 10.6 9.99
Total financial assets 6,639,837 46.4 48.46
Demand deposits and cash 405,280 2.8 3.46
Time and savings accounts 1,876,473 13.1 11.80
Money market funds 209,732 1.5 0.31
a
Securities 2,148,268 15.0 20.82
U.S. Govt. securities 407,197 2.9 2.62
Savings bonds 76,147 0.5 1.29
Other Treas. issues 252,124 1.8 1.02
Agency issues 78,926 0.6 0.30
State & local debt 206,782 1.5 1.15
Corp. & foreign bonds 43,331 0.3 0.61
Open-market paper -332 -0.0 0.20
Corporate equities 1,491,310 10.4 16.25
Life insurance reserves 229,904 1.6 2.80
Pension Fund Reserves 1,398,584 9.8 6.57
Miscellaneous assets 371,596 2.6 2.71
Total Assets 14,298,216 100.0 100.00
47 R. GOLDSMITH, THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET OF THE UNITED STATES,
1953-1980 (1982).
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Table 1
1984 Year-End Balance Sheet of Individuals in the U.S.
with Assets and Liabilities at Current Cost
(continued)
Amount % of Total Avg. % of Total
Category ($million) 1984 1961-84
Liabilities
Mtgs, owner-occ. nonfarm 1,325,035 9.3 8.09
Noncorp. bus. mtg debt 515,541 3.6 2.94
Consumer credit 577,098 4.0 3.79
Security credit 34,595 0.2 0.30
Other debt 361,719 2.5 2.25
Total liabilities 2,813,988 19.7 17.38
Net Worth 11,484,228 80.3 82.63
a. Money market fund assets have been listed as a separate asset on the balance sheets only since
1974. The average since 1974 is 0.68. However, before that time there was presumably only a
negligible amount of assets in such funds.
C. Financial Assets
1. Savings Accounts, Checking Accounts, and Money
Market Fund Shares
Assets consisting of essentially cash and cash equivalents consti-
tuted over 17% of the total assets held by individuals in 1984.48 Except
to the extent that the system attempts to deal with inflation explicitly,49
it should not need to include these assets in an accrual system. They
retain the same nominal value from year to year, and any increases in
value derived from them are reflected in interest payments already in-
cluded in income.
50
48 For totals of demand deposits and currency, time and savings accounts, and
money market fund shares, see table 1, supra pp. 1125-26. The average for 1961-1984
is about 15.6%. Both the Federal Reserve Tables and Goldsmith's data for 1975 pre-
sent similar percentages. See Appendix A, table A-1 & table A-2; FEDERAL RESERVE
BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 46; R. GOLDSMITH, supra note 47.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 252-55.
50 Taxing cash equivalents presents other potential problems. Both the present
system and an accrual system must address the issue of whether and how to tax in-
come-in-kind items, such as the benefits given by banks to depositors who maintain a
minimum balance in a checking account. The present system does not attempt to value
such items. If Congress in adopting an accrual system omitted these items from the
yearly valuation requirement it would create no additional problems. Although there
would be fewer other untaxed income items under an accrual system, which might
exacerbate the problem of valuing income-in-kind, the high marginal rates of the cur-
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2. United States Government Securities
Securities issued by the United States government make up a little
less than 3% of assets held by individuals. 51 These financial assets in-
crease and decrease in value while also yielding interest income. Be-
cause the changes in value reflect only changes in market interest rates,
not changes in the creditworthiness of the United States government,52
the IRS could be required to publish tables listing the values of United
States government obligations with various combinations of interest
rates and maturities. Taxpayers would use these values in calculating
gain or loss on government securities. 53
An even better solution is available for the bulk of United States
obligations, which are not in bearer form." The tax law could require
the United States government as debtor to mail to holders of such obli-
gations (with a copy to the IRS) the information needed to compute tax
liability-the value at the end of the year based on a market indicator
set by statute.55 While this will increase costs to the United States, it
rent system, which also exert significant pressure on taxpayers to create structures that
produce untaxed income, would be reduced. See MEADE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 7-11. An accrual system permits a decrease in tax rates, and hence a reduc-
tion in pressure to create such arrangements, by increasing the tax base. For discussion
of the measure of the increased tax base created by an accrual system, see Appendix B.
51 See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26. This figure is higher than the 1961-1984 aver-
age. See id. In contrast, Goldsmith's data show only 1.8% of all individually held assets
in United States government securities in 1975, see Appendix A, table A-2, but much of
this difference may be explained by an increase in holdings of government securities by
individuals in the interim.
52 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE § 7-1, at
118 (2d ed. 1984). Although some argue that changes in values resulting from changes
in interest rates should not be taxed, that conclusion clashes with the Haig-Simons
definition of income. See Shachar, supra note 11, at 1852-55. For an explanation of the
Haig-Simons definition, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
53 Since the information on values would not be available until after December
31, it could not be sent to taxpayers as a matter of course with their tax forms. Tax-
payers owning United States debt in bearer form, at least, would thus have the burden
of obtaining the information for themselves.
" Since the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 310, 96 Stat. 324, 595-600 (1982), all federal obligations (ex-
cept those with a maturity of less than one year and certain obligations issued to for-
eigners) must be issued in registered form. Of the $1,435.7 billion marketable obliga-
tions of the United States outstanding as of January 31, 1986, only $17.7 billion were
in bearer form. Telephone conversation with Charles Haworth, Deputy Director, Of-
fice of Government Finance and Analysis, United States Department of Treasury
(May 7, 1986).
8 Different types of federal obligations change in value in different patterns, see
Appendix A at notes 7-9. These differences are largely due to different maturities. One
might question whether it is best to use the actual market quotations at the end of the
year, or whether some average of end-of-year values might be best. The same question
will be raised below in the discussion of traded securities. See infra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text.
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will decrease compliance costs for taxpayers. It will also result in the
IRS receiving more information on who has taxable income from these
debt instruments, thus increasing compliance with the tax laws. Since it
is now accepted that the tax law can place reporting obligations on the
United States government, and so treat it like other debtors, 6 this as-
pect of the proposal will not be a major change for our tax system.
3. Other Debt
State and local obligations, corporate and foreign bonds, and open-
market paper constitute about 1.8% of all assets held by individuals.5"
If such debt is publicly traded, a rule requiring the obligor to send
information about end-of-year value to the debtholder should work
well. 58 On the other hand, if the debt is not publicly traded, valuation
would be difficult. Moreover, if the debt is not only privately traded
but also issued by a foreign entity, getting information on value to the
holders would probably be impossible, because an obligation to furnish
the relevant information could not easily be imposed on foreigners.59
To the extent that the value of debt depends solely on interest
rates and dates of maturity, it is possible to determine this value
mechanically.6 Unfortunately, other variables can affect the value of
debt. The debtor's creditworthiness affects the fair market value of the
debt, and thus the value of debt can change when the creditworthiness
56 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6041A(a)-(b), (d)(1) (1982) (requiring certain persons re-
ceiving services or selling products to make information returns and defining "person"
to include "any governmental unit and any agency or instrumentality thereof"); I.R.C.
§ 6049(a), (d)(1) (1982) (requiring every "person" who pays interest over $10 to make
a return and defining "person" to include "any governmental unit and any agency or
instrumentality thereof"); I.R.C. § 6050H(a), (c) (Supp. 11 1984) (requiring persons
receiving interest on mortgages of $600 or more to make a return and defining "per-
son" to include any "governmental unit and any agency or instrumentality thereof").
17 See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26. Goldsmith's figures are approximately the
same for 1975. See Appendix A, table A-2. Note in addition that the category on which
this section is based excludes other debt, such as mortgages.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
' According to Goldsmith, less than one-tenth of U.S. investment abroad in 1975
was investment in foreign bonds, while seven-tenths was in direct investments and bank
and government loans. See R. GOLDSMITH supra note 47, at 177. Goldsmith reports
$264 billion of U.S. investment abroad in 1975. See id. at 174 table 80. If 10% of that
total were in foreign corporate bonds held by individuals, it would constitute less than
one-half of one percent of all assets of individuals. Presumably, a substantial portion of
such bonds are held by U.S. corporations. Of course, if foreign bonds were given special
treatment, there is a danger that holdings of them would increase. To the extent foreign
bonds are publicly traded, it may be possible to require reporting by the debtor.
60 See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 52, at §§ 4-1 (determining the
value of government bonds), 20-1 (determining the value of an option), 21-1 to 21-2
(determining the value of risky debt).
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of its issuer changes."1 The determination of a creditor's creditworthi-
ness cannot easily be associated with mechanical determinations, except
with respect to large public corporations whose debt instruments are
rated by the major credit agencies. 2
Additional problems arise when provisions peculiar to particular
debt instruments enter into the valuation. If the debt is convertible into
another security, for example, the value of the debt may depend more
on the value of the financial instrument into which it can be converted
than on the general price level of the credit markets.6" The nature of
any property that secures the debt may also affect the value of the debt,
as may special provisions that allow the corporation to call the debt 6" at
its request or take other action that could affect the riskiness of the
loan.
Recent changes in the tax law have attempted to identify any por-
tion of the gain on a debt instrument that can be ascribed to anticipated
interest return on the debt. This return includes not only original issue
discount, 5 but also any market discount.66 The owner of debt, under
existing law, must pay an annual accrual tax on original issue dis-
count.17 Present law does not require taxpayers to accrue and pay tax
on market discount annually, but it does characterize gain on sale as
ordinary income to the extent it represents accrued market discount.6"
Thus, procedures for calculating market discount already exist. A more
complete accrual system could be achieved by applying these procedures
to all outstanding debt.
Accruing the interest on debt does not account for changes in the
61 For example, bonds are rated on the basis of 'judgments about firms' financial
and business prospects." Id. at § 21-6 table 21-6. If there is a significant change in a
company's financing or prospects, the rating, and thus the value of the bond, will
change. See id. at § 21-4.
62 See, e.g., STANDARD AND POOR'S BOND GUIDE (1985).
" For a discussion of the method of valuing convertible bonds, see R. BREALEY &
S. MYERS, supra note 52, at § 23-2.
" To "call the debt" is to repay the amount borrowed before the final date that it
is due.
65 See I.R.C. § 1272(a) (Supp. 111984) (including in income an amount equal to
the sum of the daily portion of the original issue discount for each day on which a
person held the debt instrument). The original issue discount is any excess of the stated
redemption price at maturity over the issue price of the debt instrument. See id.
§ 1273(a).
6 See id. § 1276(c) (West Supp. 1986) (setting out the method for determining
the amount of accrued market discount). Market discount is any excess of the stated
redemption price of the debt instrument at maturity over its basis immediately after its
acquisition by the taxpayer. See id. § 1278(a)(2) (Supp. 111984). Section 1276(c) com-
plements the rule in § 171, which has long allowed a deduction for market premium as
well as for original issue premium. See I.R.C. § 171(a)-(b) (1982).
6'7 See I.R.C. § 1272(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
" See id. § 1276(a).
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value of the principal of the debt. Most state and local obligations, as
well as corporate and foreign bonds held by individuals, are presuma-
bly publicly traded, 69 so current valuation should be possible for many
of these instruments. Moreover, open-market paper should pose few
valuation problems; it is often sufficiently short-term that its value fluc-
tuates very little.70
For those debt instruments with values taxpayers cannot easily
measure, two possible solutions exist. The better solution, in my view,
would require taxpayers to prepare a reasonable estimate of these val-
ues based on the relationship between the interest rate on the debt and
some benchmark rate such as an average federal rate in the year they
make the loan .7 For example, if the benchmark rate in the year of the
loan is 10%, and the taxpayer lends at 15%, this method would value
the debt in subsequent years using a rate 150% of that year's bench-
mark rate. 2
If this method is viewed as too cumbersome, the system could ex-
clude these debt instruments from strict accrual treatment, and adjust
gains and losses for deferral in the manner advocated above for assets
excepted from annual valuation.7 ' This second solution-removing un-
traded debt instruments from the accrual system-could encourage peo-
ple to invest in these instruments, but such a result seems unlikely.
Normally taxpayers favor a realization system because they can control
when to sell their assets and so realize losses and gains; selling debt
instruments that are not publicly traded is likely to be difficult, how-
ever, because such debt will probably be illiquid and subject to large
discounts on sale. Moreover, the system developed above for assets ex-
" To the extent state and local governments borrow directly from entities, such
borrowings are presumably from institutions such as banks and insurance companies
rather than individuals. Individuals hold directly only about one-third of all state and
local government debt. See 2 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 26, at 252.
70 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 52, at 686 (average maturity of
commercial paper is approximately six weeks); id. at 687 (bankers' acceptances gener-
ally mature in one to three months). Commercial paper and bankers' acceptances are
the two components of open-market paper.
71 If, as I suspect, most of the 1.8% of all assets held by individuals that consist of
state and local obligations and corporate and foreign bonds, see table 1, supra pp.
1125-26, are publicly traded, this difficult-to-measure category may consist of little
more than 0.1% of all assets of individuals.
7'2 To continue the example in the text, if the current year's benchmark rate is
15%, and the obligation under consideration had a rate of 150% of the benchmark rate
in the year it was entered into, we would discount this obligation using a discount rate
of 22.5% (150% of 15%). An even simpler system would simply calculate factors that
would be used to adjust the values of all loans entered into in a particular year. For
example, we could say that at the end of 1985 the value of all loans entered into in
1980 was 103% of what they were worth at the end of 1984.
73 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
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cepted from annual valuation will normally absorb the expected benefit
of deferral. Accordingly, removing nonpublicly traded debt from the ac-
crual system should not create a large market in a new tax-shelter
investment.
At a more fundamental level, should debt be included in the ac-
crual tax system at all? Because debt represents simultaneously a liabil-
ity for debtors as well as an asset for creditors, any gain on the credi-
tor's side-resulting, for example, from the right to receive interest at a
fixed rate above the current market rate-may be matched by an offset-
ting loss on the debtor's side as long as there is no systematic difference
between the tax rates of debtors and creditors."4 Thus, this elaborate
system of valuation may produce no net change of income in the tax
base. If that is so, is the effort worth it?
One response to this question is that even if the amount of income
in the system as a whole is unchanged by the accrual method, the mea-
surement of income for particular taxpayers will be changed in a way
that better measures their economic income. Thus, applying the accrual
method to debt will produce a fairer tax system.75 Nevertheless, this
answer may not be sufficient if the burden of applying the system is
great and the increase in fairness only marginal.
There is, however, good reason to think that the amount of income
in the system as a whole will be changed substantially, and hence that
the increase in fairness due to an accrual system is more than marginal.
The reason is that United States government obligations make up about
half of all the debt held by individuals.7 6 For such obligations there is
no taxpayer on the debtor's side, so that changes in the value of the
debt will have a net effect on the tax base.
Once the accrual system includes United States government obliga-
74 See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
75 See PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 213. This proposal limits
the use of cash method accounting and encourages the use of accrual accounting be-
cause it recognizes that
[tihe cash method of accounting frequently fails to reflect the eco-
nomic results of a taxpayer's business over a taxable year .... Obliga-
tions to pay and rights to receive payment are disregarded under the cash
method, even though they directly bear on whether the business has gener-
ated an economic profit or a loss.
Id. The economic accrual of income, described in this Article, is not identical to an
accountant's accrual of income, referred to in the President's proposal.
78 United States debt was 2.9% of total individual assets at the end of 1984, com-
pared to 1.8% for state and local obligations, corporate and foreign bonds, and open-
market paper. See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26. Including the other debt obligations,
mainly mortgages, that are classified under the "Miscellaneous" category, see infra
note 107 and accompanying text, adds approximately 1.5% more into the private cate-
gory, making the final totals 2.9% for United States debt and 3.3% for other debt.
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tions, it becomes unattractive to exclude other forms of debt. United
States debt and other debt compete in the marketplace. If one is in the
accrual system and the other is not, investors may prefer one to the
other for tax reasons. This distortion leads to the type of tax planning
that the accrual system seeks to limit. Hence, the accrual system should
include as much debt as possible.
4. Corporate Equities
Corporate equities constitute 10.5% of all assets held by individu-
als.7 7 Corporate equities have been a particular focus of those consider-
ing the possibility of accrual taxation, both as part of an overall accrual
taxation scheme,78 and as part of accrual schemes that include only
publicly traded corporate securities.79 The reason for this attention is
clear: publicly traded stock is both easily valued and highly liquid.
Thus, the two major problems inherent in accrual taxation, valuation80
and liquidity,. substantially disappear when publicly traded stocks are
considered.
What value should be used to measure gains and losses on publicly
traded stocks at the end of the year? The simplest solution would use
the value on the last day of the year. Such a rule would arguably en-
7 See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26. This percentage is substantially less than the
1961-1984 average of 16.25%. See id. Goldsmith's figures reveal an even lower percent-
age in corporate stock-only 8.5% of 1975 assets. See Appendix A, table A-2. A signifi-
cant portion of the difference may be traced to the 2.8% of individuals' assets in trust
funds, listed separately in Goldsmith's table. See R. GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at
114-15 table 47. Trust fund assets are included in the Federal Reserve figures for
individuals. See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 46, at 16.
78 See, e.g., COMMISSION TO REVISE, supra note 30, at 16-17 (proposing that
stockholders include in their individual incomes dividends received, plus or minus ap-
preciation or depreciation of stock values during the year); David & Miller, A Proposal
for Revision of Capital Gains Tax Provisions of the Federal Internal Revenue Code,
reprinted in Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4275, 4281-82 (1969) (advocating a system in which tax
would be due in the year of gain if a gain were recorded, and losses could be used to
offset other items of income); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 476-84
(recommending the repeal of the undistributed profits tax as it then stood and advocat-
ing that individuals be required to value their shareholdings each year).
79 See, e.g., Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly
Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967); Thuronyi, The Taxation of Corporate In-
come-A Proposal for Reform, 2 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 109 (1983); Note, Realizing
Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securi-
ties, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982).
80 Even for the most widely-traded stocks, valuation problems arise, for example,
in relation to the value of large blocks and control blocks. One proponent of accrual
taxation of stock discusses these questions in some detail, and reaches the seemingly
reasonable conclusion that large blocks and controlling shares should be taxed the same
as other stock in order to avoid granting a substantial privilege to a very few, wealthy
individuals. See Slawson, supra note 79, at 647-51.
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courage some large shareholders to manipulate prices at the end of the
year. However, this seems unlikely since an end-of-year valuation rule
under current law has worked with apparent success in the case of fu-
tures contracts."1 Inasmuch as the futures markets are less regulated
than the stock market, the natural forces in the marketplace should
provide enough protection against price manipulation in the market for
corporate equities. If, however, manipulation of end-of-year stock
prices became a problem, the accrual tax system could use an average
of closing prices for some period at the end of the year, perhaps two
weeks or a month, with a longer period for stock that trades in a less
active market.8 2
The treatment of corporate stock that is not publicly traded raises
more serious problems. Although the data for making an estimate re-
quire significant qualification, roughly 15.9% of all stock held by indi-
viduals (1.8% of all assets held by individuals) come from corporations
for which values cannot easily be obtained."
Several earlier proposals have suggested methods for valuing non-
publicly traded stock. The Twentieth Century Fund, for example, sug-
gests that valuations of unlisted stocks be based on percentage changes
in book values."4 Such an approach is ill-suited for untraded compa-
nies, which are mostly small closely held corporations that can too eas-
ily manipulate their book values.8 5
81 See I.R.C. § 1256(a)(1) (1982 & West Supp. 1986) (gain or loss calculated by
taking the fair market value of the contract on the last business day of the taxable
year).
8" No matter what period is chosen, stock purchased during that period should not
have gain or loss recognized for it in the year of purchase. Otherwise, one could buy
stock on December 31 and know with substantial assurance that the purchase would
result in a gain or a loss for that year. Such a rule would invite purely tax-motivated
planning: buy on December 31 with a guaranteed loss, sell at a tax "gain" on January
2, thus rolling over some income into the following year.
8 The best source for this conclusion is the IRS summary of data from 1965
estate tax returns. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1965: FIDUCI-
ARY, GIrt AND ESTATE TAX RETURNS 72 table 1 (1967). The data are analyzed in
Blume, Crockett, & Friend, Stockownership in the United States: Characteristics and
Trends, 54 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus. No. 11, at 16 (Nov. 1974) (published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce). The 1965
data show that, for estate tax filers who distinguished closely held, that is, untraded,
stock from traded stock, untraded stock was 15.5% of traded stock. Blume and his co-
workers increase the actual dollar figures by 25% to account for stock held by persons
who would not file estate tax returns. They then estimate the extent to which such
stock was stock of Subchapter S corporations. They conclude that, in 1971, $61 billion
of untraded stock was stock of Subchapter S corporations and $33 billion was stock of
other corporations. They then compare the total, $94 billion, with total direct holdings
by individuals in 1971 of $590 billion in domestic stock, yielding 15.9%, as cited in the
text. See id. at 21-23, 34.
84 See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 477-78.
'5 This may not disqualify the use of book value for those who would compare an
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David and Miller propose a system in which accountants would
regularly value untraded securities. In the intervening years, taxpayers
would assess increments in value using an index of asset values pub-
lished by the Treasury Department. As an additional check on the pro-
cess, the owners of business interests evaluated under this system would
have to publish the valuation with a binding offer to sell those interests
at a fixed percentage above their official valuations."8
Unfortunately, the threat of forced sales would not lead to accurate
stock valuations in most situations. This tactic works relatively well
when applied to real estate, which potential buyers can often evaluate
by visual inspection and review of public records. In contrast, closely
held corporations can usually be valued only after an inspection of their
books, which owners will legitimately balk at as a regular practice.
Furthermore, unlike real estate values, the value of many closely held
corporations derives largely from the involvement of their owners with
the business; if owners sold their interest much of that value would
dissipate.
An alternative to these two proposals is to reduce the need to value
nonpublicly traded stocks. This result can be achieved in two ways.
First, the tax system can eliminate the tax on the stock of corporations
that are taxed like partnerships ("S corporations").8 7 In order to under-
stand why this approach makes sense one must consider how the ac-
crual system will tax the owners of sole proprietorships and partner-
ships. Changes in the values of assets of sole proprietorships and
partnerships should be taxed directly to their owners and partners re-
spectively."8 If a pass-through rule is adopted for partnerships, it
accrual system to current law. Under current law, about two-thirds of untraded corpo-
rations are taxed like partnerships. See supra note 83 (presenting evidence that $61
billion out of $94 billion in untraded stock represented stock in S corporations, which
are taxed like partnerships). Many observers believe that such corporations manipulate
their income figures under current law. This manipulation is evidenced by one bitter-
sweet summary of a discussion of accrual taxation: "The lawyers and investment coun-
selors present emphasized the valuation difficulties that might arise with accrual. They
pointed out that since a closely held corporation can show almost any income it wants,
it would be very difficult to obtain a valuation for tax purposes." M. DAVID, supra
note 8, at 215. The lawyers and investment counselors in the quoted passage did not
explain why a system that relies indirectly-through valuations-on income figures of
closely held corporations would be worse than the current system, which relies directly
on those same income figures.
8 See David & Miller, supra note 78, at 4282.
87 See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1982 & West Supp. 1986).
88 This conclusion seems unavoidable in the case of sole proprietorships, whose
assets are owned directly by individual taxpayers. In the case of partnerships, it reflects
the common treatment of partnership income as if a partnership were an aggregate of
its partners, not a separate entity unto itself. See generally 1 W. MCKEE, W. NELSON
& R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1 1.02 [3]
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should also apply to S corporations. Therefore, the shareholders of an S
corporation would recognize the corporation's income and loss directly,
including increases and decreases in the value of its assets. There would
be no need to tax the change in the value of stock in S corporations.89
The second method of reducing the need to value nonpublicly
traded stock involves providing an incentive for more corporations to
become-and remain-publicly traded, and hence capable of valuation.
One incentive structure that is consistent with an accrual system is the
elimination of the corporate income tax for publicly traded, but not for
closely held, corporations. Current law uses the corporate tax to pro-
vide immediate taxation of corporate income, while deferring direct tax-
ation of shareholders until either the corporation makes a distribution
or the shareholder disposes of stock. An accrual system, on the other
hand, would tax shareholders immediately on the increases and de-
creases in the value of their shareholdings. Those increases and de-
creases, in turn, would reflect the income or loss incurred at the corpo-
rate level, plus the changes in values of corporate assets. 90 Since an
accrual system would tax shareholders directly, little reason would re-
main to tax the corporation separately. Thus, for corporations whose
shareholders are taxed on changes in the value of their shares,91 that is,
(1977) (describing the present blend of entity and aggregate treatment).
89 Eliminating the accrual tax on S corporation stock would leave shareholders
with the problem of valuing the business assets represented by their shares. This prob-
lem will be treated in a later section. See infra notes 162-98 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 162-98 and accompanying text for discussion of business assets.
91 Two categories of shareholders might not be easily taxed on these changes in
value: foreigners and tax-exempt entities. Commentators have viewed the treatment of
foreigners as a serious problem in the implementation of an accrual system. See, e.g.,
Shoup, supra note 8, at 100-01. Indeed, the problems of dealing with foreign share-
holders was a major reason that the Carter Commission, which thoroughly considered
major tax revisions in Canada in the 1960's, decided not to eliminate the corporate tax.
See 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION 5-6 (1966).
Nevertheless, both the 1984 Treasury proposals and the President's 1985 propos-
als included partial integration of corporate and individual income taxes with special
treatment of foreigners. See PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 125-26
(imposing a compensatory withholding tax on dividends paid to foreign shareholders
who are not entitled to the benefits of a bilateral treaty); 2 TREASURY PROPOSALS,
supra note 26, at 139-40 (denying deduction of one-half of dividends paid to foreign
shareholders by imposing a compensatory withholding tax on deductible dividends paid
to foreign shareholders). In light of the willingness of Congress to impose a complex
withholding system in the case of sales of real property by foreigners, see, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 1445 (Supp. 11 1984) (imposing a tax equal to 10% of the amount realized on the
disposition of a domestic real property interest by a foreigner); id. § 6039C (1982 &
Supp. 11 1984) (requiring any foreign person holding direct investments in domestic
real property interests to make a return setting forth certain information), rules in the
area of corporate stock should be easy to devise and accept.
A less severe problem is presented by tax-exempt holders of corporate stock.
Neither the 1984 Treasury proposals nor the President's 1985 proposals attempts to
offset the advantages tax-exempt entities would have in a tax world with partial inte-
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publicly traded corporations, there is a strong argument for eliminating
the separate corporate income tax.
92
Despite the reduction that these reforms could effect in the num-
ber of nonpublicly traded corporations whose stocks would have to be
valued, some of these corporations would remain. For taxpayers hold-
ing shares in these closely held non-S corporations, with stocks com-
prising about 0.6% of all assets held by individuals,93 the system should
adopt the method described above for treating assets excepted from the
annual accrual system.
One alternative might be noted for future consideration. The sys-
tem could experiment with full integration for these nonpublicly traded
corporations." All closely held corporations would then be treated
gration. Under current law, tax-exempt entities are taxed on income earned by unre-
lated businesses that they own directly, see I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (1982 & West Supp.
1986), but not dividends received from corporations or capital gains on stock of a corpo-
ration, see id. §§ 512(b)(1) & (5). Because the tax on unrelated business income was
introduced to prevent unfair competition from tax-exempt entities, only those tax-ex-
empt entities that run a business directly are viewed as able to trade on their exemp-
tion. See S. REP. No. 781, Part I, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1951) (stating that income
derived from any "unrelated business activities carried on by state universities and
other schools of governmental units should be taxed in order to avoid "opportunities for
unfair competitive advantage"). This conclusion is troubling even under current law,
since a shareholder's pre-tax return on investment in a corporation should be about the
same as the pre-tax return on direct investments. This follows from the fact that a
taxable individual investor who is choosing between a noncorporate investment and a
corporate investment presumably expects the corporate investment to yield as much as
the noncorporate investment after the corporate tax is taken into account. Thus,
whether or not the corporate income tax were eliminated under the accrual system,
some tax should be imposed on tax-exempt entities that are shareholders, unless the
reason for their exemption is to be totally reexamined. For a discussion of the compara-
ble problems under integration proposals, see, e.g., C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE
INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 169-73, 185-214 (1979).
92 Abolition of the corporate tax might have seemed even more radical if it had
been suggested a few years ago, but after the introduction of ACRS in 1981, it became
realistic to consider a corporate income tax system that, in fact, collected little from its
targets. In the period 1975-1985, while the percentage of total federal receipts repre-
sented by the individual income tax rose from 47.3% to 50.9%, the percentage repre-
sented by the corporate income tax fell from 14.5% to 9.1%. See A. ANDO, M. BLUME
& I. FRIEND, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 28 table 2.3
(1985). Proposals linking abolition of the corporate tax with an accrual tax on share-
holders have been made before. See, e.g., Thuronyi, supra note 79, at 121.
91 As indicated in the text at note 83, 1.8% of all assets are in hard-to-value cor-
porations. Two-thirds of these are taxed like partnerships, see supra note 85. Thus,
only one-third of 1.8%, or 0.6%, consist of corporations we need be concerned about.
" Note that eliminating the corporate tax differs from full integration, under
which the income of the corporation is taxed directly to the shareholder. Under some
forms of integration, it is possible to pass tax incentives (such as investment tax credits)
through to shareholders. See, e.g., C. McLURE, supra note 91, at 92-145. A pure
accrual system that abolishes the corporate tax would not normally apply any tax-based
incentives to corporate activity, because the corporation has no tax liability against
which to take a tax credit or deduction. To retain tax incentives for corporate activity,
policymakers must either devise an equitable allocation of tax benefits to shareholders,
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under an expanded Subchapter S. Since they are generally smaller cor-
porations, they would normally have simpler capital structures than
larger corporations, and thus would not offer the kinds of problems in
implementing integration that more complicated corporate structures
raise.9 The danger with expanding Subchapter S to deal with these
corporations is that the system would either need to restrict the corpo-
rations in their capital structures or to devise elaborate rules for dealing
with the allocation of income and loss in the context of complicated
capital structures. In the latter case, it is unlikely that all forms of ma-
nipulation can be avoided, thus opening up a new area for tax
complexity.
5. Life Insurance and Pension Reserves
Life insurance and pension reserves constitute 11.4% of all assets
held by individuals.9" The fact that their earnings are not taxed to ben-
eficiaries has not escaped notice in the past, as commentators have con-
sidered taxing those earnings, even under the present realization
system.97
thereby solving a basic problem in implementing full integration, or allow corporations
to cash in on the incentives so the incentives actually increase the value of the
corporation.
" The problems raised by the complicated capital structures of large firms that
issue more than one class of stock has led to consideration of a system of integration
applied only to small firms. McLure, however, considers such a proposal, in the inte-
gration context, "a shell not worth the effort." C. McLURE, supra note 91, at 157. It
should be noted that many small corporations will have a class of preferred stock owned
by the founders of the corporation that was created for estate planning purposes. Such
stock can be dealt with in an integration system by assigning corporate income to its
holders in an amount equal to the dividends paid on the stock.
90 See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26.
17 See, e.g., PRFSITDNr's TAx PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 254-58 (proposing to
include in income yearly increases in the amount by which the life insurance policy's
cash surrender value exceeds the policyholder's investment in the contract); 2 TREA-
SURY PROPOSALS, supra note 26, at 257-62 (advocating taxation of inside interest built
up in life insurance policies as measured by changes in surrender value); see also
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 60 (proposing that insurance companies inform policy-
holders annually of income earned from life insurance policies and that the reported
amount would be included in policyholders' income); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX 125-33 (1976) (noting that the taxation of savings earned through life
insurance would result in considerable administrative inconvenience to government, in-
surance companies, and policyholders); Irenas, Life Insurance Interest Income Under
the Federal Income Tax, 21 TAX L. REV. 297 (1966) (advocating the taxation of in-
come from life insurance directly to the policyholder); Sunley, Employee Benefits and
Transfer Payments in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 75, 77-82 UJ. Pechman
ed. 1977) (concluding that for most insurance programs the right to receive benefits
should be taxed, but for tax-transfer programs the benefits themselves should be taxed).
In addition, the Treasury Department considered in 1977 a proposal to tax the interest
element of cash value life insurance, but rejected it at that time because of anticipated
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Taxing insurance earnings would be feasible. The computerization
of insurance companies has reached a technological level that enables
them to supply policyholders with a summary of yearly earnings. 8 Ac-
cordingly, President Reagan has proposed that policyholders be taxed
on the annual increase in the cash surrender value of their insurance
policies, net of the policyholder's total investment in the contract."
Similarly, the tax system could fairly easily implement a tax on
income from pension plans (although the decision to do so raises ques-
tions of national retirement policy which are beyond the scope of a gen-
eral proposal for accrual taxation). Defined contribution pension plans
create an account for each employee, and so automatically have value
figures for each employee that could be used to calculate the employee's
annual income. For defined benefit pension plans, assumptions would
be necessary to translate the expected benefit into a current value. Nev-
ertheless, all elements of that calculation appear to be present in the
structure of the existing pension rules. The plan permits participants to
ask for a statement of their benefits once each year.' 0 Furthermore,
any defined benefit plan that offers an annuity as an option must pro-
vide the employee with an explanation of the values of the alternatives
offered.10 1 The assumptions used in those calculations should be adapt-
able by all defined benefit plans to value participants' anticipated
benefits.
industry opposition. See Tax Reform Option Papers Prepared by Treasury Depart-
ment, September 2, 1977, for the White House, reprinted in 196 DAILY REPORT FOR
ExEcUTIvES (BNA) 41-42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Option Papers].
8 Both authors who considered taxation of earnings on insurance reserves in the
mid-1960's expressed concern about the computational difficulties of making the calcu-
lations, but both indicated that the calculations could probably be made with the aid of
computers. See R. GOODE, supra note 97, at 133; Irenas, supra note 97, at 321. The
1977 Treasury study of comprehensive income taxation recommended that total income
associated with whole life insurance policies be taxed, and would have required the
insurance companies to inform insureds of the amount of this income. See BLUEPRINTS,
supra note 11, at 60.
"I See PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 256. Additional investment
for this purpose includes the gross premiums reduced by policyholder dividends and
other distributions and the cost of renewable term insurance. Because different insur-
ance companies charge different amounts for term insurance, it may be difficult to de-
cide precisely how the term insurance cost should be calculated. Nevertheless, the use of
IRS tables for setting the term insurance portion of the calculation should assure that
no policyholder is taxed on too large an amount of income. See 1977 Option Papers,
supra note 97, at 42. Because the President's proposal does not tax unrealized appreci-
ation generally, a special rule is provided for variable life insurance treating the policy-
holder as owning a pro rata share of the separate account underlying the variable
policy.
100 See 29 U.S.C. § 1025 (1982).




The Treasury Department, in Blueprints for Basic Tax Re-
form,10 2 suggests a simple alternative means of including pensions in
the accrual system. Rather than attempting to measure income of the
pension fund attributable to each beneficiary, the proposal would tax
the fund on all income earned by it. If tax rates remain the same for all
relevant parties, such a tax can be combined with a current employer
deduction for contributions to a pension plan and a current employee
exclusion of contributions to such plans, as long as the employee is
taxed on all distributions from the plan, including amounts already
taxed once when earned by the fund. 03
The neutrality of such a proposal depends very much on how close
the pension plan's tax rates are to the tax rates of the employer, on the
one hand, and those of the employee-beneficiary, on the other. If the
fund is taxed at the same rate that the employee or employer would
otherwise be paying, the proposal can be said to work perfectly.'"
One way to ensure that beneficiaries of a pension plan receive no
special tax benefit is to impose the tax at the maximum tax rate for the
current year. Such an approach, however, penalizes employees who
have tax rates below the maximum rate. Because the tax incentives in
the pension law probably are intended, to a significant degree, to bene-
fit just such employees, 05 it would be unfortunate to have to adopt
such an approach. In deciding between this simpler approach and the
attribution of income approach suggested previously, the extent of un-
fairness to such lower income employees is important. Under current
law, with its wide range of individual tax rates, an accrual system
should attempt to measure each pension participant's benefits directly.
If, however, Congress adopts one of the current tax reform proposals
that flattens the rate structure of the tax system, the simpler proposal of
taxing the income of the fund directly would become the preferred
approach. 0
102 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 56-58.
103 See id. at 57; Halperin, The Time Value of Money-1984, 23 TAX NOTES
751, 753 (1984).
'o See Halperin, supra note 103, at 753-54.
105 That intention to benefit employees in lower tax brackets is presumably the
reason for the nondiscrimination rules in the pension law. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)
(1982).
108 Sunley suggests, as an alternative, the taxation to employees of the pension
fund's earnings, rather than taxing employees on the difference in value of the vested
pension benefits. See Sunley, supra note 97, at 81-82. In an accrual world, this solution
would not be complete to the extent that the actual asset owned by the employee is the
defined benefit. For example, if interest rates went up substantially, the plan might not
need to allocate any income to the beneficiary, since the increased potential earning
power of the assets in the plan would be sufficient to cover the employee's defined
benefit. It might be necessary, however, to record a loss for the employee in terms of
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6. Miscellaneous Financial Assets
The Federal Reserve data classify about 2.6% of all individually
held assets in the miscellaneous category. About half of these assets
consist of mortgages held by individuals, and much of the remainder
consists of claims against insurance companies, consumer credit (owed
to individuals), and loans to brokers.
10 7
Most mortgages could be treated like federal obligations.108 The
discussion above of federal obligations reveals that the accrual system
can value a debt instrument with a particular interest rate and maturity
if it can disregard both the creditworthiness of the debtor and the possi-
bility of special provisions in the debt instrument that might make valu-
ation difficult.109 Arguably, neither of these problems plague most
mortgages. As long as the security for the mortgage covers the amount
due under the mortgage-an issue that can be resolved under the pro-
posed method for valuing real property generally 11 -the creditworthi-
the present value of the employee's defined benefit in those circumstances. Finally, note
that Sunley's objections to taxation of pension earnings to employees, which depend on
the fact that other assets are not taxed on an accrual basis, would not apply in a world
where most other assets are taxed on an accrual basis. See id. at 82.
107 This composition can be seen by comparing the figures in the Federal Re-
serve's table for individuals, see table 707 ("Assets and Liabilities of Individuals") of
the Federal Reserve's balance sheets for 1945-1984 (copy on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review), with the tables from which it is derived, see FEDERAL
RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 46, at 16-25 table 702 (households); id. at 26-
30 table 703 (farms); id. at 31-35 table 704 (nonfarm, noncorporate business). Note
that table 707 for individuals includes totals for corporate farms. The categories of
assets and nominal amounts, as reflected in those other tables are:
Miscellaneous Financial Assets, 1984
Amount
Category ($million) % of Total
Mortgages 160,366 43.39
Farms-insurance receivable 19,174 5.19
Farms-equity in spons. agencies 4,279 1.16
Nonfarms-consumer credit 33,384 9.03
Nonfarms-insurance receivable 33,630 9.10
Nonfarms-equity in spons. agencies 861 .23
Security credit (loans to brokers) 18,143 4.91
Miscellaneous 99,738 26.99
Total 369,575 100.00
The "Miscellaneous" category in the above table consists of household claims against
insurance companies. Telephone interview with Elizabeth Fogler, Flow of Funds Sec-
tion, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Aug. 6, 1984).
10s See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
109 See id.
110 See infra notes 130-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 134:1111
ACCRUAL TAXATION
ness of the debtor is not so substantial an issue. In addition, one does
not normally expect to find significant variations in a mortgage that
would affect its value. Thus, the proposed mechanism for translating
debt with a fixed interest rate and maturity into a single value""'
should enable the system to value the bulk of mortgages. The system
could treat those mortgages that could not be valued easily (for exam-
ple, those in default or those for which the security has dipped below
the amount due) under the method described above for assets excluded
from annual valuation.
Like mortgages, loans to brokers pose few problems of valuation.
These loans are essentially demand deposits held by brokers which can
be withdrawn by customers at any time. 112 Thus, they can be valued at
their face amounts, like checking accounts, unless the broker becomes
insolvent.
In contrast, insurance claims should be exempt from accrual taxa-
tion, as they are under current law. Generally, the present system as-
sumes that the insurance claim will be paid; until then, a taxpayer can-
not take a deduction on the loss for which a claim was made. 1 If the
accrual system maintains this rule it does not need to tax insurance
claims, because the value of the assets will be largely canceled out by
the losses that triggered the payment. Moreover, the fact that most in-
dividual insurance claims are likely to be for "assets" that the proposed
accrual system would not cover in any event-life, health, and con-
sumer durables-further supports a decision to exclude the insurance
claim from the system.
Finally, the system should also exclude consumer credit. Consumer
credit is normally sufficiently short term that its value will change very
little (unless it goes into default). Accordingly, there is little to be
gained from including it in the system.
D. Tangible Assets
1. Owner-Occupied Housing
Owner-occupied housing comprises one of the largest categories of
assets held by individuals. The structures themselves make up 16.9% of
the assets listed in Table 1. Owner-occupied land adds another 7.8% of
111 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
112 The figure used for this data in the Federal Reserve balance sheets is derived
from (although it is not identical to) a figure for "Free Credit Balances at Brokers" in
72 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN A-25 table 1.36. A footnote to this table indicates
that these amounts are "subject to withdrawal by customers on demand." Id. at n.4.
"I See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2) (1960).
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total assets, giving a total of 24.7% for all owner-occupied housing.114
In order to determine the most desirable treatment for owner-occu-
pied housing under an accrual system, the special tax treatment af-
forded housing under the current system must be considered. Current
tax law does not recognize losses from the sale of assets such as resi-
dences that are personal in nature.' 5 In contrast, the current tax law
provides very favorable treatment for gains from the sale of a principal
residence." Under section 1034,"" a taxpayer may defer the gain on
the sale of a principal residence to the extent that the taxpayer reinvests
that gain in another principal residence within two years of the sale. In
addition, under section 121,"18 a taxpayer aged fifty-five or more may
exclude from income up to $125,000 of gain on a sale of a principal
residence.
Two other provisions that apply to other assets as well also offer
favorable treatment of gains from the sale of residences. First, sales of
owner-occupied housing receive capital gains treatment." 9 Second, if a
homeowner dies, the fair market value of the home becomes its tax
basis, shielding any accrued gain from future income tax. 20
Given this background, the accrual tax advocate faces two alterna-
tive treatments for principal residences: taxing gains on principal resi-
dences on a yearly basis, or taxing these gains only on recognition, with
or without the current exceptions. I will take up these two alternatives
in turn.
a. Including Residences in the Accrual System
If residences are to be included in the accrual system, tax policy-
makers must decide whether any of the current provisions applicable to
114 Goldsmith summarizes a study of household wealth in 1962 that concluded
that owner-occupied homes comprised 27% of household wealth in that year. See R.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 137 table 57 (citing D. PROJECTOR & G. WEISS, SUR-
VEY OF FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMERS (1966)). Because the Federal
Reserve's data, see FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 46, show only
22.7% of assets in owner-occupied homes in 1962, it is possible that the percentages in
the text underestimate holdings of owner-occupied homes. For other detailed estimates
of household wealth, see Bossons, The Distribution of Assets Among Individuals of
Different Age and Wealth, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE STOCK
394 (R. Goldsmith ed. 1973).
115 See I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(3), 262 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
"" Principal residences are a slightly narrower category than owner-occupied
housing included in table 1, supra pp. 1125-26, to the extent that the former category
excludes second homes.
11 I.R.C. § 1034 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
118 Id. § 121 (1982).
"1 See id. § 1221 (1982).
120 See id. § 1014 (1982 & West Supp. 1986).
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owner-occupied housing should be retained. The general proposal out-
lined above eliminates favored capital gain treatment and taxes the gain
on death, and there does not appear to be any reason to treat owner-
occupied housing differently from other assets with respect to these two
provisions. Several arguments for the special treatment of capital
gains-encouraging investment and moderating lock-in effects-do not
apply to principal residences, because such assets are not commercial in
nature. The other arguments for capital gains treatment-preventing
the bunching of income and moderating the effects of inflation-would
carry less weight under an accrual system, because tax rates could be
lowered and inflation could be explicitly taken into account. Except in
the case of a home passing to the spouse of a decedent, when no tax
should be imposed, at the time of death there is no reason to treat
homes differently from other assets. The estate tax has no special rules
for homes not passing to a decedent's spouse.
If the tax system gives accrual treatment to gains, should it also
provide accrual treatment for losses? Under current law, losses on per-
sonal residences are not deductible.12 An accrual system must allow for
losses to some extent, because recognizing gains but not losses is partic-
ularly troublesome in an accrual system: if a taxpayer overvalues a per-
sonal residence, there may never be a compensating reduction of income
if the system does not allow for losses on personal residences.122 The
system could solve this problem, however, with a moderate increase in
record-keeping requirements, by allowing losses to be accrued to the
extent they offset gains accrued previously.
23
Is a system that taxes all gains on personal residences but allows
losses only to the extent of prior gains a fair one? Initially it might
seem more generous than current law, which taxes recognized gains on
residences and never allows losses to be taken. However, the provisions
for tax-free reinvestment of gains (section 1034) and untaxed gains for
those over age fifty-five (section 121) eliminate the bulk of gain taxa-
tion. Indeed, if section 1034 were continued in an accrual system, there
would be no accrual taxation of residences, since the increased value of
an asset is always, in effect, "reinvested" in that asset.
But if section 1034 is not continued in an accrual system, the re-
121 See I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(3), 262 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
122 For example, suppose a personal residence that is actually worth $100,000 is
mistakenly valued at $110,000 in one year. The $10,000 of income created will not be
matched by a compensating loss even if the asset were sold in the next year for
$100,000.
12 Cf. I.R.C. § 267(d) (1982) (allowing nonrecognition of gain on the sale of
property where the property was bought from a related party who did not recognize a
loss on the original transfer because of §267(a)(1)).
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striction on the use of losses under the system may properly be viewed
as too severe. As Professor Epstein points out, 24 losses on personal
property are of two types. Some losses are the equivalent of deprecia-
tion. Since the imputed income on personal property is not recognized
by taxpayers, it is inappropriate to allow business-type deductions such
as depreciation. Other losses reflect changes in market conditions. Since
gains on personal residences reflecting market changes are recognized
by taxpayers, Professor Epstein argues forcefully that such losses
should also be recognized.
125
When we translate these arguments into a world of accrual taxa-
tion, we find strong reasons to exclude personal residences from the
accrual system. As described more fully below,126 the accrual system
will attempt to value investment and business real estate on an annual
basis, taking account of changes in value due both to market changes
and to wear and tear. If we include personal residences in the system,
we would have to add to this process a method for differentiating these
two types of changes in value. This would surely be a very difficult
task, and would substantially increase the number of taxpayers who are
affected by the accrual system. Since the tax system has favored per-
sonal residences over other significant investments for many years, we
will not be creating important new incentives by excluding personal
residences from the accrual system.
b. Taxing Gains on Residences upon Realization
The decision to exclude owner-occupied housing from accrual
treatment does not end the inquiry. If we tax gains on residences upon
realization, do we maintain the existing rules of sections 1034 (exemp-
tion of gains that are reinvested in another principal residence) and
section 121 (one-time exemption of up to $125,000 of gain for taxpay-
ers over age fifty-five)? The original reasons for including section 1034
in the Code relate to the hardship of taxing persons who are compelled
to move for personal reasons such as increased family size or a change
in the place of employment. 2 Since these reasons have nothing to do
with valuation problems, section 1034 could be continued in an accrual
system."' Moreover, any increase in the tax on these market gains
13 See Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal Property under the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REv. 454 (1971).
125 Id. at 471-72.
126 See infra text accompanying notes 130-49.
127 See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951), reprinted in 1.951 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1969, 2004.
128 In contrast, because I.R.C. § 1031 (1982), the provision deferring tax on like-
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raises anew the question of whether market losses should be recognized.
We avoid these difficult problems, which are unrelated to the accrual
system, by continuing the favored treatment of gains on residences.
These arguments also justify preserving the section 121 exemption.
On the other hand, the tax system should eliminate other favored
treatment for owner-occupied housing. Sections 1034 and 121 provide
sufficient protection for homeowners. If the system preserves these sec-
tions, it does not need to treat gain from the sale of residences as capital
gain. It also should not protect gain on death, except to the extent gain
on sale would have been shielded by section 121, or where the residence
is transferred to a surviving spouse.12 9
2. Other Real Property
The relatively simple solution developed for owner-occupied hous-
kind exchanges, is in the Code for reasons related to our realization structure, it would
be eliminated by this proposal. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 8, at 3 ("If taxpayers were
required to value their assets annually, and to take the current increase or decrease into
account currently, a number of complexities in the existing law would evaporate.
Among them would be the elaborate rules regarding non-taxable [like-kind] ex-
changes."); see also supra notes 40-42.
12I The existing tax structure greatly limits the tax revenue currently received
from changes in the value of owner-occupied housing. In 1973, taxed gains from resi-
dence sales constituted approximately 3.9% of all capital gains. See INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE, 1973, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SALES OF CAPITAL ASSETS REPORTED
ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 21, 26 table 1
(1980) [hereinafter 1973 CAPITAL GAINS REPORTS] (showing amounts of gross gain
on all assets and on sales of residences); id. at 163 table 11 (showing amount of de-
ferred or excluded gain on the sale of residences); see also Appendix A, table A-5
(reproducing some of the percentages that can be derived from this IRS study).
The current treatment of the sale of personal residences is substantially more
favorable than the 1973 rules. In 1973, taxpayers aged 65 or over (rather than 55)
could exclude only that portion of their gain that $20,000 constituted of the full sales
price (rather than excluding all gain up to $125,000). Compare I.R.C. § 121 (1982)
with id. § 121 (1976). Nevertheless, the benefit from § 121 constituted over 14% of the
total benefits afforded to gains from the sale of principal residences. The current rules
have increased by five or six times the amount of gain from the sale of personal resi-
dences that the tax base excludes. Compare SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., TAX EXPENDITURES 163 (Comm. Print 1978) (estimate of $70 mil-
lion loss in 1980 tax collections from section 121 prior to changes made by the Revenue
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 404) with STAFF OF THE JOINT TAX COMM.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1978, 257 (Joint Comm. Print
1979) (estimate of $415 million loss after the statute passed).
Given the relatively small amount of gain from the sale of personal residences that
is currently taxed, Congress should seriously consider eliminating from income calcula-
tions all gain from the sale of personal residences. After the application of § 1034 and
§ 121, the taxpayers who remain to be taxed on gains from their residences-those
under age 55 who do not reinvest sufficient proceeds and those over age 55 with more
than $125,000 of gain-do not comprise a coherent group to target for taxation. It may
be appropriate to exempt them from an accrual system that does not tax increases and
decreases in the value of residences.
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ing will not work for other real estate, which does not enjoy the same
favorable tax treatment and as to which no distinction need be drawn
between changes in value due to market forces and those due to wear
and tear. Land and residences that are not owner-occupied constitute
14.1% of the assets listed in table 1, and some portion of the 5.2% of
assets that are nonresidential plant and equipment consists of real es-
tate.'30 Gains that can be traced to real estate make up at least the
same percentage of all recognized gains, and probably substantially
more. 3' Because real estate owned by individuals represents a substan-
tial portion of all individually held investment assets that change in
value, a reasonably comprehensive scheme of current valuations must
find a way to incorporate these assets.
Previous proposals that have considered real estate under an ac-
crual system generally base income tax valuations on the assessments
used for calculating local property taxes."32 Unfortunately, recent devel-
opments in local self-governance limit the usefulness of such an ap-
proach. Local initiatives such as Proposition 13 in California'33 and
Proposition 2 in Massachusetts' restrict local assessors. For exam-
ple, under the present law in California, local assessors can increase the
valuation of property by no more than 2% each year, unless the owner
sells the property so that a new value can be determined from the sale
SO The land category in the Federal Reserve balance sheets appears to refer only
to land associated with residences.
'3' For a summary of the IRS data on capital gains reported on 1973 individual
tax returns, see Appendix A, table A-5. Of all gross gains, 8.1% resulted explicitly from
nonbusiness real property other than personal residences, and 3.8% of gross gains were
§ 1250 gains, see I.R.C. § 1250 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), which are all real property
gains. In addition, 7.7% of gross gains were allocations from partnerships and fiducia-
ries. Because more than three-quarters of all nonfarm, nonfinancial partnerships are
real estate partnerships, see R. GOLDSMITH supra note 47, at 159 table 70 ("Structure
of Balance Sheet of Nonfinancial Nonagricultural Partnerships, 1975"), it is likely that
a large portion of that gain also arises from real estate. Another 9.7% of gross gains
were gains from prior year installment sales, and based on the case law under the
installment sale provision, see I.R.C. § 453 (1982 & West Supp. 1986), it is likely that
more than half of that gain arises from real estate transactions too. A LEXIS search of
cases raising § 453 issues decided in 1984 and 1985 shows that 12 of the 22 cases
involved sales of real property.
'32 For example, the Twentieth Century Fund's proposal in 1937 suggested that
percentage changes in assessed values might be used as a basis for valuing real estate.
See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 490-91. Similarly, David and
Miller, in their more recent proposal for accrual taxation, suggest that taxpayers sub-
mit evidence of the level of assessment of their properties, along with locally prevailing
assessment ratios. Thereafter, any changes in assessments would have to be reflected as
an increase in value in the federal income tax return, unless the taxpayer could submit
evidence that such was not the case. See David & Miller, supra note 78, at .4282.
133 CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
134 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 59, § 21C (West 1985).
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price.13 5 Thus, there is no longer any necessary relationship between
assessments and relative values in such jurisdictions.
An alternative to reliance on government assessments might be a
self-assessment system. Some commentators have suggested such a sys-
tem for all assets in an accrual income tax system,13 and Professor
Levmore discusses it in significant detail as a means of enforcing the
local property tax.137 Under a self-assessment system, the owner reports
a property value on which the tax is based. In order to ensure that a
taxpayer will not understate the property value, the tax system provides
an incentive to others in the private sector to check on the reported
value, and if they find it to be too low, the taxpayer suffers a penalty.
One straightforward approach would require the taxpayer to sell the
property at the self-assessed price, or at some premium over that
price.1
38
Another approach Professor Levmore discusses involves competi-
tive assessments. This approach encourages private persons to submit
their own assessments of properties. The person submitting the highest
assessment must be prepared to purchase the property at that amount.
If the owner is unwilling to sell, however, the highest assessment be-
comes the basis for levying the property tax.' 9 Professor Levmore sug-
gests that the prospect of being able to buy the property at the assessed
level may provide sufficient compensation for the private sector asses-
sors.140 If a richer reward is needed to attract private assessors into the
market, Professor Levmore suggests that a commission be given to the
assessor with the highest bid when the owner chooses to accept the as-
sessment rather than sell the property. The commission would be based
on the additional revenue generated by the higher assessment.',
Whether or not the competitive assessment system might work for
the property tax, it does not fit well with the federal income tax. Once
a commission must be paid to attract assessors into the market, the sys-
tem flounders because, unlike a local property tax, the income tax does
l' CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b).
1 See M. DAVID, supra note 8, at 215 (report of conference discussion); see also
Bradford, supra note 2, at 83 (in developing an accrual system for real estate, "one
could imagine a system of self-assessment").
117 Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L.
REV. 771, 778-83 (1982).
"I See M. DAVID, supra note 8, at 215; Levmore, supra note 137, at 778-83.
Such a result seems unpalatable, however, to the extent that it may force persons to sell
properties that they are quite happy to retain. See id. at 783-84. The force of this
objection is substantially diminished in the context of this Article, because the proposal
would not cover personal residences.
"' See Levmore, supra note.137, at 783-88.
140 See id. at 787-88.
141 See id. at 784-85.
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not have a single uniform tax rate. Thus, an increased assessment does
not guarantee increased income tax revenue.
Indeed, because a taxpayer can have a zero marginal tax rate, al-
lowing a reward for a high assessment could result in the government
losing money on the reassessment. This difficulty suggests an underly-
ing problem with using any method of assessment that the taxing au-
thority does not control: some taxpayers under an accrual tax system
will want to have their assessments increased in a particular year. In-
flating an assessment is the equivalent of shifting income into the year
of the inflated assessment. Such shifting may, for example, allow addi-
tional deductions to be used in that year, with the prospect of reducing
the assessment in a later high-income year, generating a more valuable
loss in that later year. " 2 This shifting could clearly take place under a
self-assessment system; competitive assessments simply raise the specter
of collusion between owners and private assessors, a particularly awk-
ward possibility if commissions are to be paid to these private assessors.
To combat this potential problem, new sanctions would have to be de-
vised, which would lead the system down the treacherous road of com-
plexity and tax planning.
The required system, therefore, must generate values for proper-
ties in a mechanical way that does not need an army of assessors, yet
will produce reasonably accurate results. In theory, it seems possible to
construct such a system by starting with sale prices and adjusting for
increases and decreases in value since the most recent sale, based on
changes in value of other properties in the same area, as reflected in
their sale prices.
In fact, such systems do exist. Computer-assisted appraisal systems
have been developed for local governments based on accepted statistical
techniques.14 3 One commentator has previously suggested that such sys-
tems be employed to implement a wealth tax in the United States."'
.2 Arguably, there is nothing wrong with taxpayers accelerating income into a
tax year. Presumably taxpayers would accelerate income to even out their income over
their lifetimes. Such an evening out has been viewed as an appropriate goal for an ideal
tax structure. See Vickrey, supra note 19, at 737. Moreover, the taxpayer may be
paying a price, since the taxpayer's income may not increase to the extent the taxpayer
had anticipated. However, where the tax system does not explicitly allow all taxpayers
to increase their incomes at will, a method that allows such a result for only some
taxpayers will, at the least, generate a perception of unfairness, which should be
avoided.
143 See, e.g., A. CHURCH & R. GUSTAFSON, INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF ASSESS-
ING OFFICERS, STATISTICS AND COMPUTERS IN THE APPRAISAL PROCESS (1976); J.
DASSO, INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, COMPUTERIZED ASSESSMENT
ADMINISTRATION (1974).
144 See Address by R. Cooper, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, The Ninth
Mortimer H. Hess Memorial Lecture delivered before the Association of the Bar of the
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The potential use of computer technology at least raises the possibility
that a national real estate valuation system administered by the IRS
could be implemented.
The magnitude of such a project mandates careful consideration
before it is adopted. In those states where taxpayer initiatives have not
restricted land assessors, the land assessments (or some multiple of
them) might be relied upon. If, however, no reliance is made on local
assessment, the total start-up cost of such a system on the national level
would be between 20% and 27% of the IRS's current budget, and the
annual costs thereafter would be between 7% and 15% of its current
budget.1 45
Even the large costs of a total national assessment system might be
City of New York (May 29, 1978), reprinted in 34 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 24, 37 (1979).
145 National data on assessed properties can be found in 2 UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 13 (1984). Of the 98.4 million par-
cels that were subject to local assessment in 1981, 55.0 million (55.9%) were single
family homes (including condominiums). Suppose, for simplicity, these were all owner-
occupied, and thus excluded from the accrual tax system; then only the remaining 43.4
million parcels would have to be valued for accrual tax purposes. The rule of thumb
among assessors is that the average per parcel cost of ongoing assessment operations lies
in the range of $9 to $13. The start-up costs of parcel-by-parcel assessment is $25 per
parcel, on average. Letter from Richard R. Almy, Executive Director of the Interna-
tional Association of Assessing Officers, to the author (Sept. 20, 1984).
However, the costs of assessing multi-family homes are likely to be three times
those amounts, while the costs of assessing commercial or industrial properties may be
four times those amounts. On the other hand, the cost of valuing raw land is negligible.
Telephone interview with Richard B. Almy (Dec. 26, 1985). In 1981, there were 3.2
million multi-family homes, 4.1 million industrial and commercial properties, and 34.3
million parcels of raw land that were assessed. In addition, there were 1.9 million
"other and unallocable" properties. Using these figures, one can develop minimum as-
sessment costs by assuming no cost for valuing land and "other" properties, while one
can calculate maximum costs by assuming that other properties are as costly to value as
commercial property, and that land costs $1 per parcel to value. The resulting costs in
millions of dollars are as follows:
Cost of Real Estate Appraisal
Start-up ($25) Ongoing ($9) Ongoing ($13)
Minimum $649.7 $233.9 $337.8
Maximum $870.1 $335.1 $468.9
In fiscal 1984, the IRS spent $96.4 million on salaries and expenses, $896.6 mil-
lion on processing tax returns, $1,250.9 million on examinations and appeals, and
$1,018.7 million on investigation, collection, and taxpayer services, for a total of
$3,235.6 million on all administrative expenses. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 1986, at 8-166, 8-167 (1986). These figures yield the percentages dis-
cussed in the text. Some states exclude limited categories of privately-owned real prop-
erty from the property tax, see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.33 (West Supp.
1986) (forest land taxed on the basis of timber harvested from it), so the numbers of
assessed properties used above may be slightly understated.
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justified in light of three considerations. First, the substantial simplifi-
cation of the tax law under an accrual system should significantly re-
duce the costs of administering other aspects of the law. Not only will
there be fewer issues to resolve but, significantly, there will be fewer
complicated issues. Second, the simpler law will reduce compliance
costs for taxpayers. This consideration should certainly matter to
policymakers. 48 Finally, the federal government will essentially be du-
plicating the assessment function of those local jurisdictions that at-
tempt to base property taxes on the actual value of real property. Ac-
cordingly, it may be possible to reduce local assessment functions,
generating additional cost savings from a national perspective.
14 7
How would information generated by a national real estate valua-
tion system be used in the administration of our tax laws? Operating
analogously to local property tax systems, an accrual system could re-
quire the IRS to send the valuations developed by the system to taxpay-
ers along with their tax forms. Since the IRS would send out those
forms at the end of the tax year, the computer evaluation might be as of
some earlier date in the year. 48 Taxpayers could then choose to use the
computer-generated value or to claim a different value on their returns.
Claiming a different value, however, would presumably increase the
likelihood of an IRS audit, which would thus serve as a natural brake
on such occurrences, and hence on the need for a more elaborate
valuation.
One aspect of this structure breaks significantly with past tax ad-
ministration. Under the contemplated system, the IRS would develop
an assessment and send the information to taxpayers, for use by tax-
payers in the current year's tax returns. The enormous amount of per-
sonal information the IRS would have to collect requires a considera-
tion of the possibly excessive invasion of privacy. But using the IRS to
generate tax information for individual taxpayers as a matter of course
146 For an example of an analysis that explicitly takes account of compliance costs,
see Brannon, Simplification and other Tax Objectives, in FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIM-
PLIFICATION 191, 193-200 (C. Gustafson ed. 1979).
1,7 A somewhat comparable structure exists in the Code currently. Under I.R.C.
§§ 6361-6365 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), the IRS is authorized to collect state taxes as
part of the federal collection effort. These provisions have not proven popular because
states are substantially restricted in the nature of tax systems that they can employ. See
id. § 6362. In contrast, the assessment system proposed in the text would simply pro-
duce valuations of properties for local governments, without limiting the ways those
governments might employ the valuations.
14" As discussed below in connection with implementation, see infra note 266,
end-of-year valuation might be used with an extension of the due date of tax returns.
Note that, because real estate is not very liquid, the likelihood of tax planning leading
to sales near year end, but after the valuation date, is not great. This contrasts with the
discussion of implementation, see id.
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has already been anticipated with the rise of computer capabilities.
More than fifteen years ago one commentator suggested that, in con-
nection with income averaging and bad debts, for example, the IRS
might be the expected source of prior year information to be used by
the taxpayer.149 Moreover, this proposed system does not involve any
significant amount of knowledge that the IRS does not already have
(through information on property taxes from individual returns, for ex-
ample) or that is not to a substantial degree public knowledge (through
local property assessments). Therefore, the maintenance of records on
these values by the IRS would not necessarily raise any major privacy
issues for taxpayers. In sum, this structure appears to offer a realistic
approach to dealing with one of the major problem areas that could be
expected to arise under an accrual income tax system.
3. Consumer Durables and Collectibles
Table 1 shows that 8.6% of all assets held by individuals consist of
"consumer durables." This category apparently includes such poten-
tially taxable items as antiques and works of art that are often termed
"collectibles."' 50 Collectibles alone probably constitute no more than
1% of all assets held by individuals, and are probably closer to half that
percentage.'
5'
149 See Smith, Automation in Tax Administration, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
751, 753 (1969).
150 Telephone interview with Elizabeth Fogler, supra note 107.
151 The Federal Reserve based its percentage for consumer durables on data de-
veloped in BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FIXED RE-
PRODUCIBLE TANGIBLE WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 331-41 (1982). For 1979,
the Bureau's data show the following categories of consumer tangibles:
Consumer Durables, 1979
Amount
Category ($billions) % of Total
Automobiles 274.9 31.4
Other motor vehicles 57.3 6.6
Furniture, including mattresses and bedsprings 115.7 13.2
Kitchen and other household appliances 79.8 9.1
China, glassware, tableware and utensils 37.5 4.3
Other furnishings 76.0 8.7
Radio, TV, records and other musical instruments 77.6 8.9
Jewelry and watches 52.5 6.0
Ophthalmic and orthopedic equipment 12.6 1.4
Books and maps 26.3 3.0
Wheel goods, durable toys, sports
equipment, boats, and pleasure aircraft 64.1 7.3
Total 874.3 100.0
Of these categories, only jewelry (6.0%) includes a substantial number of items of
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While consumer durables constitute a significant portion of all as-
sets, they play a very small role in the tax system. The IRS study of
capital gains in 1973 concludes that 12.7% of gross gain on tax returns
for that year came under the miscellaneous category that would include
consumer durables.1 5 2 The description of that category, however, does
not refer explicitly to consumer durables; instead, it speaks of such
items as mortgages and foreign currency. 53 Thus, the percentage of
gross gain attributable to consumer durables is probably small. Even if
more precise data existed, it would probably not show much taxable
gain in this area. Consumer durables are precisely that-goods that are
consumed, for the most part. Any potentially taxable items, such as
collectibles, that are included within this category should comprise only
a small portion of the category.
Nevertheless, the relatively small number of such assets does not
necessarily suggest removing them completely from the system. If
policymakers removed these assets from the system, taxpayers would be
encouraged to invest in them because of their tax-favored status. The
potential for tax shelters and tax planning revolving around exempted
consumer durables is too strong to ignore.
On the other hand, the problem with including such assets in the
system is that these assets are quite difficult to value. Several tax re-
form proposals have recognized this difficulty. The Twentieth Century
Fund, in its 1937 proposal, does not even attempt to include consumer
concern. A small portion of furniture (13.2%) presumably consists of collectible anti-
ques, and an even smaller portion of china and utensils (4.3%) may be deemed items of
enduring worth. Similarly, small portions of musical instruments, books and maps, and
other categories may be ascribed to collectible items. The other major repository of
items in which one might invest for a profit comes under "other furnishings" (8.7%),
which seems to be the only category that might include works of art. For collectible
assets to constitute as much as 1% of all assets, about 12% of the consumer tangibles
listed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis would need to be in the collectible category.
Even if all the jewelry (6.0%) and one-third of the other furnishings (one-third of 8.7%
is 2.9%) were in the collectible category, there would still have to be an additional 3%
from the other categories to reach 12%. These are very generous estimates, so an esti-
mate below 1% of total assets seems reasonable.
Goldsmith attempts to measure collectibles, including works of art, using data on
imports of collectibles, on the theory that most collectibles come from overseas. He must
make some very subjective estimates to reach a final estimate. For 1975, he finds $60
billion worth of collectibles among U.S. assets. See R. GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at
187-88. If all collectibles were held by individuals, Goldsmith's estimate would re-
present about 1% of all individual assets. See Appendix A, table A-2. As Goldsmith
recognizes, however, nonprofit organizations (for example, museums) hold a substantial
amount of collectibles. Thus, the actual figure for individuals alone is probably closer to
0.5% of individual assets. It is not clear, though, whether Goldsmith's estimate includes
jewelry.
152 See Appendix A, table A-5.
I53 Appendix A quotes the definition in full. See note g to table A-5.
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durables; rather, it excludes from the proposed system all assets that
would be too difficult to value."" Similarly, David and Miller, in their
1969 proposal, suggest that "gain or loss on personal property is suffi-
ciently nominal that there is no need to tax such property on an accrual
basis."'155 Finally, the Commission to Revise the Tax Structure, in its
recent proposal, states in passing that "[e]xemptions might be consid-
ered for . . . art treasures, antiques, and the like, in the same way as
consumer durables which are not held for investment." 5 If such assets
are to be valued, the Commission suggests taxation on sale (or at ten-
year intervals), with the additional tax liability spread back on a
straight-line basis using a simple interest charge on the reconstructed
deficiencies. 157
Although Professor Bittker argues generally that the simplification
produced by an accrual system could be worth the cost in appraisals, 158
taxing consumer durables on an accrual basis probably presents too for-
midable a task to be worth undertaking. Fashioning an alternative
treatment for consumer durables requires a clarification of the relevant
concerns. In the first place, the alternative should not encourage tax-
payers to invest in particular assets because of their special tax treat-
ment. Additionally, the alternative should not put pressure on the sys-
tem to decide when an asset fits into that category and when it does
not. Lastly, the alternative should be workable for the assets subject to
it and easy both for the taxpayer and for the tax authorities to apply.
For the most part, the system developed above for assets excepted
from annual valuation satisfies these criteria. However, because these
assets are passive investments and their ownership involves significant
personal enjoyment, there is a danger that excluding the most expensive
of them (such as valuable paintings and antiques) from a system of
regular valuation will create an appearance of abuse.
Accordingly, I suggest the following system for these assets:
1. Taxpayers would be required to value assets with a
purchase price greater than $20,000159 (with the exception of
1" See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 490-91.
115 David & Miller, supra note 78, at 4282.
156 COMMISSION TO REVISE, supra note 30, at 38.
157 See id.
158 See Bittker, supra note 8, at 3.
"59 Basing the test on an easily determined purchase price, as opposed to periodic
valuations, would make application of the system relatively simple. There is some dan-
ger that taxpayers would try to deflate purchase prices. If that became a serious prob-
lem, rules similar to those in I.R.C. § 483 and § 1274 (1982 & West Supp. 1986)
(distinguishing purchase price from interest on any unpaid purchase price) could be
developed.
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relatively common assets that are clearly for personal use,
such as airplanes) once in five years. The valuations would
be subject to IRS challenge like other entries on tax returns.
Any gain measured over the five-year period will be spread
back evenly over the five years, with an interest factor added
to adjust the gain upward, and the adjusted gain will be in-
cluded in income in the current year."' 0
2. For all other items of tangible personal property, the
method used for assets excepted from the accrual system
would be adopted. This rule would also apply when a tax-
payer transferred in a recognition event an item with a
purchase price in excess of $20,000.
3. Recognition of losses would be governed by the rules
of current law, without most of the current rules for nonrec-
ognition. The system would continue to disallow losses on
assets not held in a trade or business or as an investment.
Nevertheless, to the extent a taxpayer previously recognized
a gain on an asset under the system of valuations every five
years, the system would allow the taxpayer to deduct these
losses.161
E. Business Assets
The discussion so far has focused predominantly on assets that are
not used in a trade or business, except for real property. Many of the
160 This is like the rule for assets excepted completely from annual valuation,
supra text accompanying notes 38-45. Note that the process of adjusting the gain figure
is a surrogate for a more elaborate system. After the total recognized gain is allocated to
prior years, the system might require the taxpayer to calculate the tax that would have
been paid in that year on that additional income, and then increase the tax (rather than
the gain) by an interest factor to reflect the benefits of the deferral. But that procedure
would be more complicated, and would not allow the IRS to develop adjustment tables
that could be used by all taxpayers. Nevertheless, the procedure suggested in the text
has two disadvantages: on the one hand, it would bunch the income in the year of
valuation; on the other hand, it would make the tax liability dependent on the tax-
payer's other income in the year, thus leaving room for tax motivation to govern the
timing of sales. If this problem were perceived as significant, the proposal could be
modified to provide, for example, that the tax rate applied to the recomputed gain
would be dependent, in some fashion, on the taxpayer's marginal tax rates in some or
all of the prior five years.
11 This rule for losses will leave a current source of conflict in the Code-the
desire of taxpayers to claim that loss assets were held for investment-but should not
significantly increase the pressure on the distinction. To the extent the accrual system
would result in a larger tax base, and hence lower rates, the pressures would be re-
duced. On the other hand, eliminating the distinction between capital assets and other
assets would increase the pressure, since losses would become more valuable.
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previous proposals for accrual taxation have stopped at this point, re-
stricting themselves to investment assets."6 2 Is it possible to extend the
proposal to business assets?
Some business assets, namely those held by corporations, are al-
ready included indirectly in the proposal to the extent that the value of
corporate stock reflects changes in the value of these assets. Conversely,
the proposal does not yet include business assets that are held in sole
proprietorships or in pass-through entities whose owners would include
changes in the values of their assets on their own tax returns. Thus, a
complete proposal requires explicit treatment of business assets. The
major categories of business assets are inventories, accounts receivable,
depreciable personal property, and intangibles such as good will.
1. Inventories
Inventories pose particularly difficult valuation problems because
they include many different items, some of which may be obsolete or
damaged. Despite this difficulty, the current tax system requires inven-
tories to be valued in order to reflect taxable income correctly. 63 Under
existing law, the two major methods of valuing inventories are cost and
the lower of cost and current market price.'"
Of the two basic methods, allowing valuation at the lower of cost
and market price requires some form of valuation every year; thus, this
method could carry over into an accrual system. Similarly, the last-in,
first-out (LIFO) inventory method, currently an authorized alternative
for inventory valuation, 6 5 requires a form of valuation at the end of the
year in some circumstances. This method allows an even more desirable
practice from the perspective of an accrual system. Taxpayers can use
the "dollar-value method" of pricing inventories, 6 under which, in ef-
fect, the taxpayer creates a private index for the costs (albeit not the
value) of the inventory. Moreover, as authorized by statute, 67 govern-
mental price indices can be used under the LIFO method instead of a
taxpayer's own constructed index of costs.
The fact that taxpayers and the IRS have already accepted the
16' See, e.g., David & Miller, supra note 78, at 4275.
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958).
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(c) (1958).
165 See I.R.C. § 472(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1986) (authorizing LIFO inventory
method).
166 See Treas. Reg. § 1.472-8(a), T.D. 6539, 1961-1 C.B. 167, 168 ("The dollar-
method of valuing LIFO inventories is a method of determining cost by using 'base-
year' cost expressed in terms of total dollars rather than the quantity and price of
specific goods . . ").
167 See I.R.C. § 472(f) (West Supp. 1986).
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possibility of using price indices as a means of measuring inventories
suggests that an accrual system could include inventories in a reason-
able fashion. The IRS could construct an index that would reflect in-
creases, as well as decreases, in the prices of relevant inventory catego-
ries, with the number and precision of the categories dependent on the
relative importance of precisely mirroring inventory price movements.
Of course, any rule that depends on categorizing assets raises the
specter of significant complexity in its application. This problem is
likely to be less severe with inventory than with depreciable property
(discussed below) to the extent that inventory, by its nature, comes to
the marketplace more often, so that it is easier to determine whether
the index used to value it is accurate.
2. Accounts Receivable
The current treatment of accounts receivable already reflects prin-
ciples of accrual taxation to a significant degree. Cash-basis taxpayers
include accounts receivable in income on the basis of their value."6 8 Ac-
crual-basis taxpayers must include the face amount of debt owed to
them in income,169 but that rule is part of a general scheme under
which they are also permitted to deduct expenses before the expenses
are paid. While the system does not precisely account for fluctuations
in the value of accounts receivable, it does permit taxpayers to deduct
any accounts receivable that become worthless.170 Moreover, to simplify
the calculation of debts that become worthless, taxpayers are allowed to
create a bad debt reserve, generally based on their prior credit history,
which will account for the debts that do become worthless. Thus, ac-
counts receivable are already treated in a way that reflects a concern for
a simplified system, but one that looks generally to the value of the
accounts receivable from year to year. Particularly in light of the gener-
ally short-term nature of accounts receivable, there is no need to revise
this structure generally to add additional aspects of accrual taxation.
For businesses that deal with unusually long-term accounts receivable,
however, the methods suggested above for valuing debt generally could
be used.1
71
3. Depreciable Personal Property
The introduction of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
188 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-292, 1979-2 C.B. 287, 289.
189 See id.
170 See I.R.C. § 166(a)(1) (1982).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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(ACRS) in 1981172 substantially severed the connection between al-
lowed depreciation and actual decreases in the values of assets. ACRS
aims to encourage the purchase of assets by allowing deductions that
are accelerated compared to actual depreciation.1 3 Although the 1982
tax statute limited ACRS somewhat, 174 the main thrust of encouraging
investment through accelerated depreciation allowances remains.
If Congress adopts an accrual tax system that includes most assets,
the ACRS method will clash more frequently with the structure of the
system. Because Congress did not base the decision to switch to the
ACRS system on an attempt to measure income precisely, Congress
would not necessarily eliminate ACRS under an accrual income tax
system. Still, ACRS has two motivations behind it: simplicity of valua-
tion and incentive for investment. It may well be wise to decrease the
incentive aspect of ACRS under a system that generally expands the
tax base and hence allows a reduction in tax rates. Otherwise the bene-
fits of neutrality and equity that can come from an accrual tax system
could be obliterated. The 1984 Treasury proposal suggests that it may
be possible to develop a single depreciation system that approximates
economic depreciation.
17 5
4. Good Will and Other Intangibles
There is no estimate of the cumulative size of good will and such
other intangibles as copyrights and patents.1 7 Good will, in particular,
12 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172,
203-19 (current version at I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1986)).
173 See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 106.
Reductions in the real value of depreciation deductions diminish the prof-
itability of investment and discourage businesses from replacing old equip-
ment and structures with more modern assets that reflect recent technol-
ogy. The committee agrees with numerous witnesses who testified that a
substantial restructuring of depreciation deductions and the investment tax
credit will be an effective way of stimulating capital formation, increasing
productivity and improving the nation's competitiveness in international
trade. The committee therefore believes that a new capital cost recovery
system is required which provides for the more rapid acceleration of cost
recovery deductions and maintains or increases the investment tax credit.
Id. at 47, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 106, 152.
174 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 206, 96 Stat. 324, 431 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 168(b)(1), 168(e)(4) (West Supp.
1986)).
171 See 2 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 26, at 151-72 (proposing Real Cost
Recovery System under which "[n]ew capital cost recovery rules would be established
that explicitly account for inflation and . . . real economic loss[es] .... Id. at 157).
176 See R. GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 190.
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is quite difficult to value.1 7 Although intangibles are so common that a
reasonable proposal for accrual taxation must consider including them,
a thoughtful examination leads to the conclusion that all intangibles
can be omitted from the system.
a. Human Capacity
Taxing a business's intangibles largely means taxing potential in-
come; that is, an increase in a business's good will reflects the expecta-
tion that the business will be making more money in the future."' 8 Let
us consider taxation of a business's potential income after we consider
an even more extreme proposal: taxing the increase in an individual's
"good will"-the individual's "human capital." For example, when an
individual's potential lifetime income is increased by graduation from
medical school, should the system immediately tax this increased
"value"? Such a result seems dangerous to most of those who have con-
sidered it,'7 9 because it would tax the medical school graduate who
chose not to become a doctor-or, at least, chose not to be a highly
compensated doctor.
One commentator who makes such a criticism is Professor Kel-
man.' He argues that forcing a beachcomber to work as a doctor (the
example is his) to pay taxes "would violate the simple libertarian prin-
ciple that the state should not require people, directly or indirectly, to
engage in particular activities."'' Indeed, absent that awkward princi-
ple, "[a]n earnings capacity tax might best achieve the tax system's goal
of measuring the inequality of economic power.'
8 2
These arguments prove too much, though. Professor Stephan sym-
pathetically examines the possibility of taxing changes in the value of
human capital.' Although he does not deal at length with the possible
177 See, e.g., Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment of the Tax
Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 TAx LAW. 251 (1975); Note, An Inquiry into
the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1953); Note, Amortization of In-
tangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 859 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Amortization]; Comment, Depreciability
of Going Concern Value, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 484 (1973).
178 In the context of debt instruments with a fixed return, that aspect of the
change in value has been criticized as double taxation, see Shachar, supra note 11, at
1866-67, although that criticism is inconsistent with the concept of taxing income.
17. See, e.g., Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income
Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1114-15 (1980).
180 See Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
"Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 831, 839 n.23 (1979).
181 See id. at 842.
182 Id. at 841.
183 Stephan, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV.
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objections to a system that forces the beachcomber with a medical de-
gree to work to pay taxes because the medical degree has increased the
beachcomber's potential earning capacity, Professor Stephan argues
that the law already imposes burdens on persons who prefer not to
work."" As examples, he notes that the law may prevent one who
breaches an employment contract from accepting comparable employ-
ment, that domestic relations courts will not reduce alimony or child
support payments when a former spouse chooses to work in a less re-
munerative way, and that certain jurisdictions may impose property
and wealth taxes on unrealized gain, "forcing the taxpayer either to sell
his labor or part with some other possession to pay the tax collector.""1 5
In addition, there are many circumstances in which the tax law
requires a taxpayer "either to sell his labor or part with some other
possession to pay the tax collector," and many circumstances in which
the state, through the tax system, "requires persons to engage in partic-
ular activities," to the same extent it would require the beachcomber
who graduated from medical school to work.' 8  Anyone who earns
money and consumes it without setting aside a portion for taxes must
earn more money to pay the income tax.8 7 Moreover, someone who
exchanges a substantially appreciated asset for other property (not
cash), without the protection of one of the nonrecognition provisions of
the Code,' must work (or sell some property) to pay tax on the gain.
Indeed, the beachcomber who combs beaches successfully will have to
choose between selling what the ocean has washed up or engaging in
other income-producing activities to pay the tax on the valuable flotsam
and jetsam.' 9
1357 (1984).
I"' See id. at 1365 n.14.
185 Id.
... Kelman's rhetoric suggests that the beachcomber would be required to work as
a doctor if human capacity were taxed, but that is not so. As long as the beachcomber
earned enough, in whatever endeavor, or sold enough property to pay the tax on in-
creased human capacity, the tax system would be satisfied.
117 As Stephan's discussion of expenditures that enhance human capital makes
clear, a portion of the increase in the medical student's earning capacity stems from the
expenditure for education, which -is currently a nondeductible expenditure. That is,
current law requires that an individual whose entire income is spent on subsistence and
medical school expenses still pay taxes. See Stephan, supra note 183, at 1373.
"I See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (1982 & Supp. 111984) (like-kind exchanges not sub-
ject to taxation).
1I9 Even if Kelman is correct that there is a "widespread principle that people
ought to be taxed only when they voluntarily convert property rights into marketable
form," Kelman, supra note 180, at 842, a court is unlikely to allow a beachcomber to
exclude the value of a found diamond ring, even if it is used to decorate a shack rather
than sold in the marketplace. See generally Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3
(N.D. Ohio 1969), affd per curiam, 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970) (money found in
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Thus, a rule taxing individuals on the increase in their human
capacity would be far from unique in forcing persons who would prefer
not to raise more cash to do so, either through the sale of assets or
through additional work. If an objection remains, it must stem from
some more fundamental (or, perhaps, less rational) source. For exam-
ple, Professor Warren argues that taxing increases in human capacity
could violate a taxpayer's "personhood."' 190
Such objections generally assume that taxing human capacity
would place a severe burden on taxpayers. Stephan points out, how-
ever, that a progressive tax system may minimize or eliminate this bur-
den. 91 If the system treats an increase in human capacity as income
and taxes it, the recognition of income will presumably create basis in
an asset that may be amortized at least over the taxpayer's expected
lifetime."' Because this income will often arise when the individual is
not otherwise employed and thus is in a low tax bracket, and because
deductions can be taken when the individual is established in a profes-
sion and thus is in a higher bracket, the net effect of taxing human
capacity might be a benefit to a significant number of taxpayers, as-
suming the taxpayers can overcome any problem of cash flow. 9 ' Thus
we are by no means creating a major loophole if we conclude that, for
practical reasons, we do not wish to include human capacity in an ac-
crual system.
The above argument assumes that if the system taxes changes in
the values of intangibles such as human capacity, it must allow deduc-
tions for decreases in value as well as taxing income on increases.
Under current law, however, taxpayers cannot take deductions for in-
tangible assets because of the difficulty of estimating the useful lives of
such assets with "reasonable accuracy."' 94 On the other hand, in a sys-
tem based on periodic accrual of changes in value, if the system in-
cludes intangibles, both increases and decreases in the value of these
intangibles must be taken into account.
piano is income).
190 Warren, supra note 179, at 1115. Contra Stephan, supra note 183, at 1365-
66 n.14.
11 See Stephan, supra note 183, at 1371-72.
192 See 2 B. BITKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiRTs [
41.2.5, at 41-15 (1981) (stating that an asset whose value is included in income takes a
basis equal to its fair market value); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976),
affd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (amortization
allowed over taxpayer's lifetime for certain costs of obtaining license to practice law).
' See Stephan, supra note 183, at 1371-72.
194 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 C.B. 127, 128. The regula-
tion states specifically: "An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is
not subject to the allowance for depreciation .... No deduction for depreciation is




Other parts of the proposed accrual tax system already value in-
tangibles, in effect. In particular, valuing the stock of a corporation im-
plicitly takes into account all assets, including good will. In contrast, in
the case of a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or other pass-through
entity such as an S corporation,"'5 an intangible must be valued explic-
itly in order to be included in the system."' If good will and other
intangibles are valued only for incorporated businesses, and if valuing
them creates a general increase in the income of those businesses, an
asymmetric tax treatment would result that could distort investment
away from the corporate sector.
Because good will, like human capacity, reflects potential income,
it increases in the years before the business receives the income. More-
over, although some decreases in good will may result from unexpected
situations (for example, unfavorable publicity about the business), good
will ordinarily decreases when a business no longer provides to its cus-
tomers the services it once did or when the earnings of a company that
previously promised substantial increases in earnings level off. Thus a
pattern similar to that of human capital may apply also to business
good will: the increases in the value of good will may arise in low-
income years, while the decreases in the value of good will may come in
profitable years. As long as tax rates remain progressive, the inclusion
'95 If we do not eliminate the corporate tax for publicly traded corporations, it
would be true for non-S corporations also that the direct tax on the corporation would
require an explicit valuation of intangibles.
19 Valuation of such assets is extremely difficult in practice, as is seen in cases
where a whole business is sold and some of the purchase price must be allocated to the
intangibles. The valuation requirement for intangibles forces business purchasers to
exclude from depreciation these intangible, or nondepreciable, assets. See, e.g., Concord
Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 1153, 1155 (6th Cir. 1980); Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973); Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 677, 686 (5th Cir.
1971); Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1962); Computing &
Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 235 (1975); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 220, 225 (1972); see also Dubin, Allocation of Costs to, and
Amortization of, Intangibles in Business Acquisitions, 57 TAXES 930 (1979) (discuss-
ing various methods of allocating purchase price to good will); Gregorcich, supra note
177 (proposing legislative solutions to handle the amortization of intangibles); Henszey,
Going Concern Value After Concord Control, Inc., 61 TAxEs 699 (1983) (examining
the "capitalization of earnings method" for establishing going concern value); Krieger,
Tax Accounting: Tax Court Explains Going-Concern Valuation, 9 J. CORP. TAX'N
297, 297-99 (1982) (same); Note, Amortization, supra note 177 (challenging the
Code's assumption that purchased good will has an unlimited life); Comment, supra
note 177 (criticizing the valuation of intangibles as depreciable assets); cf. Des Moines
Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915) (holding that going concern
value, but not good will, should be considered in valuing property for the purpose of
rate-making of public service corporations).
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of intangible assets in the accrual system may result in less change in
lifetime tax liabilities than might at first be expected.
In light of the major practical difficulties in measuring the value of
intangible assets and the relatively insubstantial net effect on revenue of
including them in the tax base, the accrual system should omit such
intangibles. But does removing direct taxation of good will from the
accrual tax system create problems because the system still taxes good
will indirectly in the case of corporate stock? I think it is unlikely that
someone embarking on a venture that can be carried out either through
a corporation or through an unincorporated or other pass-through en-
tity will choose one form over the other as a result of the different tax
treatments of good will. Because the precise timing of increases and
decreases in good will is too unclear, omitting direct measurement of
good will and similar intangibles from the system should not affect
many taxpayers' decisions, and is not likely to cause significant or sys-
tematic effects.
c. Patents, Trademarks, and Other Intangibles
The above discussion applies to intangibles that taxpayers cannot
buy or sell under any circumstances (human capital) or trade sepa-
rately from a business (good will). For related reasons, the system
should also exclude intangibles such as patents and trademarks, which
taxpayers can more easily value, as well as independently purchase and
sell.
These other intangible assets, like antiques, are all unique. More-
over, in many of the transactions in which they are purchased and sold,
the price is set as a function of actual future revenue, for example, a
percentage of future sales, rather than as a fixed dollar amount.
19 7
Thus, their valuation is likely to be difficult. Unlike dispositions of real
estate and stock of closely held corporations, which also require valua-
tions of unique items, valuation of these intangibles is likely to be an
expensive process if required in all cases.198 Although their valuation
would be less difficult than the valuation of good will and human capi-
197 See, e.g., Cory v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 941, 942, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
828 (1956) (publishers purchased copyright for percentage of future retail sales).
198 Intangibles may be difficult to value with reasonable accuracy, see B. BITTKER
& J. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
§ 11.03, at 11-9 (4th ed. 1979). Attempts to value intangibles will thus often require
more appraisal time and expense, see Bittker, supra note 8, at 3, and are likely to
result in prolonged litigation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 557,
580, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 50 (1974) (valuation must be undertaken on case by case ba-
sis); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 486, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976)
(same; also suggests need for expert testimony).
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tal, strong practical arguments advocate removing these other in-
tangibles from the system, too.
If the system excludes such assets, how should gains and losses
realized on their exchange be taxed? Once again, the structure provided
for assets excepted from annual valuation seems appropriate, with gain
taxed on realization and a deferral charge added to account for the
failure to tax increases in value when they occurred.
F. Liabilities
The discussion thus far has focused on the possibility of including
the assets a taxpayer owns in an accrual tax system. But liabilities also
change in value, a point noted above in the discussion of how to value
liabilities in the hands of a creditor. 9 ' If a tax system requires valua-
tion of a taxpayer's assets, it should also require valuation of the tax-
payer's liabilities by providing for gains when the liabilities decrease in
value (that is, the debtor's obligation decreases in value) and allowing
for losses when the liabilities increase in value.
Adding liabilities to the accrual system creates several problems.
First, a large portion of liabilities relate to assets that the proposed
accrual system excludes. According to the data in table 1, about 47% of
all liabilities consist of home mortgages on owner-occupied nonfarm
homes, and an additional 20% of all liabilities consist of consumer
credit. Moreover, some portion of the 18% of all liabilities that are
noncorporate business mortgage debts presumably relates to the resi-
dence portions of farms. The importance of including business debt in
the accrual tax system should not, however, be underestimated. Liabili-
ties affect not only the tax treatment of individuals but also the tax
treatment of pass-through entities such as partnerships and S
corporations.
A second problem involves valuation. An accurate valuation of the
debts owed by individuals depends on the particular individual's credit
situation, not just the general credit markets. Assessing the former is
not easy.
Third, even if the system includes liabilities, policy considerations
may dictate different tax treatment for different types of changes in
their value. Under current law, when a debtor has a gain on a liability,
that is, the debtor satisfies the liability at a discount, the debtor has
forgiveness of indebtedness income to which the Code gives special,
favorable treatment.200 Alternatively, when the debtor has a loss on the
"9 See supra text accompanying note 61.
200 Under United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), forgiveness of
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liability, that is, the debtor retires the debt at a premium, the Code
allows the debtor an immediate deduction.2"1
1. Valuation of Liabilities
As a first step toward solving the practical problem of valuing a
taxpayer's liabilities, the relatively simple approach described above,202
which relies on current market interest rates, seems wise. Of course,
problems of creditworthiness may arise in valuing an individual's lia-
bilities. The importance of such problems in the valuation process,
however, depends on the treatment of income or loss from changes in
the value of liabilities.
Unlike income arising from the discharge of indebtedness of tax-
payers in difficult financial straits, which the Code exempts from taxa-
tion203 because of a concern with taxing such persons,204 changes in
value resulting from fluctuations in the market interest rate evoke no
particular policy concerns. These changes can affect any debtor, not
merely one in financial difficulty. Thus, it seems appropriate to tax on
accrual the gains and losses caused by fluctuations in the market rate of
interest, with no amelioration allowed in lieu of income recognition.
Income from discharge of indebtedness arising when a debtor in finan-
cial straits repays a troubled loan at a discount could still receive spe-
cial treatment. Indeed, it would be useful to have a mechanism that
distinguishes more precisely between forgiveness of indebtedness stem-
ming from interest rate changes (which should always result in recogni-
tion of income) and forgiveness stemming from the debtor's financial
difficulties. Congress could then more easily fashion favorable treat-
ment tailored to financially troubled taxpayers.205
indebtedness income is taxed like any other income. Nevertheless, the Code currently
allows (or in some cases requires) taxpayers to reduce tax attributes (most commonly
the basis of depreciable assets) rather than recognizing such income. See I.R.C. §§ 108,
1017 (1982 & Supp. H 1984). When basis is reduced, the taxpayer has lower deprecia-
tion deductions in the future, and thus gradually recognizes the income that was de-
ferred when the debt was forgiven.
20 See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(c)(1) (1968).
202 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
202 See I.R.C. § 108 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
204 See S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7017, 7024-26 (reasons for exempting discharge of indebt-
edness income from taxation include desire to give debtors a fresh start and to give
them flexibility to decide how best to achieve that fresh start).
205 Congress's concern with identifying those taxpayers truly in need of special
treatment can be seen in the changes made to the stock-for-debt rules of § 108 in the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 59, 98 Stat. 494, 576-77 (codified at
I.R.C. § 108(e)(10) (Supp. 11 1984)). While generally tightening the stock-for-debt
exception to the debt forgiveness rules, Congress developed an elaborate exception for
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The mechanism for identifying changes in value that result from
changes in the market interest rate can be slightly complicated. The
system could simply allow the valuation of debt based on a current
market rate of interest. This method, however, would probably create
gains and losses for many individual taxpayers in the year they incur
debt because the interest rate chosen for valuing the indebtedness could
not realistically correspond to the individual rates faced by many debt-
ors.20 6 The method suggested above for valuing untraded debt on the
asset side207 proves superior in this situation as well.
2. Liabilities Related to Excluded Assets
The fact that the tax system excludes gains and losses on personal
residences does not necessarily imply that gains and losses on associated
mortgages should be excluded as well. Indeed, although current law
permits taxpayers to defer or ignore gains on residences,208 discharge of
indebtedness on a home mortgage results in income to the homeowner;
moreover, no provision exists for reducing basis rather than recognizing
income in those circumstances.209
On the other hand, if an accrual system included home mortgages,
the number of persons affected by the system would probably increase
substantially. The additional administrative burden that the taxation of
home mortgage values would put on many taxpayers may itself out-
weigh the additional benefits in equity, because the decision to buy a
taxpayers in financial difficulty. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(C) (Supp. 11 1984).
200 For example, if individuals generally borrow at a rate that is 130% of the
prime rate, an interest rate of 130% of the prime rate could be used to make the neces-
sary valuations. But that decision would create losses for taxpayers in financial diffi-
culty, who borrow at twice prime (and whose debt, therefore, would appear to have
increased in value because it had an interest rate well over the rate used for measuring
debt), whereas very wealthy individuals, who borrow at lower rates, would have gains.
Moreover, one would have to provide special rules for secured debt and other special
situations. Note that the Code already deals with income tax problems created by low-
interest loans. See I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1986).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
208 See I.R.C. §§ 121, 1034 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
209 See Rev. Rul. 82-202, 1982-2 C.B. 35 (taxpayer had income after prepaying
mortgage for less than balance due). There has been at least one failed attempt to enact
legislation allowing basis reduction for gains on mortgage repayments. The Mortgage
Debt Forgiveness Tax Act of 1983, S. 1147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc.
S5225 (daily ed. April 26, 1983), was introduced by Senators Danforth, Tsongas,
Symms, and Thurmond in 1983, and hearings were held on May 27, 1983. See 1983-
84 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, II: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20 (1983).
Because the gain ultimately recognized when a residence is sold might go untaxed
under I.R.C §§ 121, 1034 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), the net effect of this legislation
would have been to eliminate from tax much of the income on discharge of personal
mortgage debt.
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home, and thus to borrow for that purpose, is much more a consump-
tion decision than an investment decision.2"' Moreover, as interest rates
rise, thus decreasing the value of a fixed rate liability (and increasing
the homeowner's net worth), the value of real estate is likely to fall.
Since we do not take account of the change in value of the home, it is
probably wise not to take account of the change in value of the
mortgage.
The system should also exclude consumer credit. Including con-
sumer credit would require many persons who could otherwise ignore
such concerns to perform calculations of gain and loss. In addition, be-
cause consumer debt is likely to be relatively short-term debt, measur-
ing annual changes in its value would yield little gain.
The system need not exclude business debt. If the system indirectly
includes changes in the value of debt on the asset side through a tax on
the owners of these entities, there is no reason to exclude such changes
on the liability side, at least in the business context in which no major
administrative or political problems would arise from their inclusion.
3. Exclusion of Other Liabilities
Should the accrual system exclude any other liabilities? Three
other categories deserve consideration. First, the system might exclude
small loans. If the principal of a loan is below $1000, for example, the
administrative cost of keeping it on the system may outweigh any bene-
fit. Second, the system could exclude loans with adjustable interest
rates, on the theory that because such loans already account for changes
in the market rate of interest, the system should disregard any addi-
tional market effect on the value of such loans. Third, the system could
exclude loans with short maturities. Such loans probably generate little
gain or loss except to the extent already addressed by the Code provi-
sion for low-interest loans.2"
4. The Problem of Differing Treatments of Liabilities
Should there be concern that some liabilities will be in the system
and others will not? This Article has noted repeatedly that when some
items are in the system and similar items are not, a substantial possibil-
ity always exists that tax-motivated planning will result. Unlike the
comparable situation on the asset side, however, the issue here is not so
210 This argument is undercut somewhat to the extent that the system adopts the
valuation methods discussed supra, text accompanying notes 71-73
211 See I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1986).
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serious. While persons normally invest in assets in the hope of appreci-
ation, they rarely assume liabilities with an eye toward their (tax-
based) value.
Moreover, unlike eliminating the deduction for payment of interest
on debt,212 which will generally increase taxable income, the inclusion
of a debt in the accrual system is not necessarily a benefit or a detri-
ment-it depends on the level of interest rates after the debt is incurred.
Thus, no major inducements for disruptive tax planning would result
from excluding some, but not all, liabilities from this system. This ar-
gument should not, however, induce us to exclude additional items from
the system. To the extent we want to measure income accurately in
order to allocate tax liabilities fairly among taxpayers, the more items
we value, the better off we are.
III. THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM
After valuation, the second major obstacle to adopting an accrual
tax system is taxpayer illiquidity: should the tax system require a per-
son to pay a tax on the appreciation of an asset when the tax may
require the person to sell the asset? Because the proposed accrual sys-
tem excludes hard-to-value securities and most collectibles, illiquidity
poses a problem primarily for taxpayers holding real property that the
system includes. Some securities may also create practical problems of
illiquidity, since the market for some stocks may be sufficient to estab-
lish a price but too thin to allow an owner to dispose easily of a signifi-
cant number of shares.
Although the liquidity problem certainly deserves careful exami-
nation, several facts suggest that the problem may not be great. First,
under the system proposed here, taxpayers would face a less severe li-
quidity problem than taxpayers with illiquid estates currently face
under the estate tax. The tax rates of the estate tax may exceed the
highest marginal income tax rate,213 and the estate tax applies to the
full value of an asset, rather than the annual increase in the asset's
value as under an accrual system. Second, the accrual system would
expand the base for income taxation by a per-year average of more
than 20%.214 A larger base enables a reduction in income tax rates
212 Prior proposals have not been uniform in their treatment of interest. Compare
PRESIDENr's TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 3, at 104-05 (preserving deductibility of
interest) and BLUEPRINTS, supra note 11, at 7 (same) with COMMISSION TO REVISE,
supra note 30, at 23-24 (suggesting elimination of interest deduction).
21I Compare I.R.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. I 1984) (income tax rates) with id.
§ 2001 (estate tax rates).
21 See infra Appendix B.
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without loss of revenue. This decreases the likelihood that a taxpayer
with a gain on illiquid assets would incur a substantial new tax liabil-
ity under the accrual system. At the very least, taxpayers should not
have a liquidity problem to the extent that the tax on their accrued
gains simply brings their tax liabilities up to the level that they would
have paid prior to this tax reduction.
Although commentators often cite liquidity as a major problem in
developing an accrual tax system,215 prior proposals have not consid-
ered it at length. For example, neither the Twentieth Century Fund
16
nor the David and Miller proposal21. explicitly discusses the liquidity
problem. The Commission to Revise the Tax Structure recognizes the
liquidity problem, 2" but suggests only the possibility of deferring tax
payments, with interest, in the case of "large accrued gains from
growth corporations."2 9
Several commentators who would restrict the accrual system to se-
curities of various types do consider the problem of liquidity. Slawson,
in his proposal limited to publicly held stock, shows little sympathy for
shareholders who must sell stock in order to pay a tax liability.220 He
concludes that forced sales pose no problem even for a controlling
shareholder.221 Alternatively, a Note that proposes taxing appreciation
of marketable securities considers a system allowing a tax liability to
215 See, e.g., COMMISSION TO REVISE, supra note 30, at 40; M. DAVID, supra
note 8, at 184; Blum, supra note 7, at 255 (discussing liquidity problems in taxing
unrealized capital gains). But ef. Shoup, supra note 8, at 99 (people would plan
around liquidity problems if they knew accrued gains would be taxed); General Tax
Reform: Panel Discussion Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 284, 285 (1973) (statement of Prof. Richard A. Musgrave) ("The frequently
raised objection that taxation of gains not realized by sale is unfair because the tax-
payer has no cash with which to pay his tax poses a valid concern only where family
farms or enterprises are involved.").
.1 The Fund's proposal suggests alternatives to accrual taxation that would tax
gains only when recognized and provides for various types of averaging of the recog-
nized gains. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 8, at 480-82, 491. These
alternatives are designed to solve the possible constitutional problem of an accrual tax
system and reflect no concern for liquidity problems as such.
217 See David & Miller, supra note 78.
$18 See COMMISSION TO REVISE, supra note 30, at 17, 40. Its report states, "The
Commission is aware of the economic problem of paying a tax in money on unrealized
gains that, in a sense, are only paper profits." Id. at 17.
219 Id. at 40.
"' See Slawson, supra note 79, at 646-47 ("It is immaterial that [a shareholder]
might have preferred not to sell, even at an appreciated price. Tax assessments limit
everyone's ability td invest, and there is nothing in the situation of the public share-
holder to justify giving him any special consideration.").
2l See id. at 649 ("A controlling shareholder . . .who felt compelled to sell some
of his shares to raise tax money ...would fail to receive the additional value, or
'premium,' that control stock may command. . . . [But] the loss involved would be
minimal or nonexistent.") (footnotes omitted).
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accrue, unpaid, while accumulating interest. The liability would not be
payable until the taxpayer sold the stock.
222
Solutions to the liquidity problem that provide for an interest-
bearing tax liability date back to Professor Vickrey's elegant proposal
for cumulative lifetime averaging of income.223 Under that proposal,
taxpayers may deduct their investments whenever they please. The pro-
posal can allow liberal rules for deductions because it offers a compen-
sating benefit to taxpayers who pay their taxes in earlier years. The
compensating benefit comes in the form of a special tax account main-
tained for each taxpayer into which the taxpayer deposits all tax pay-
ments. The account earns imputed interest, which is included in in-
come, but that interest counts as part of the taxpayer's tax payment for
the year.224 If the taxpayer accelerates a tax payment, surrendering
funds early in the taxpayer's lifetime, the interest earned on the pay-
ment reduces the obligation to make tax payments in the future. As a
result, when a taxpayer chooses to accelerate a deduction, the effect is
the same as a loan from the government. Under current law, the loan
resulting from an accelerated deduction bears no interest.225 Under
Professor Vickrey's proposal, however, the borrower must pay interest.
Although Professor Vickrey himself notes a number of technical
problems that would arise in connection with the cumulative averaging
proposal, 226 one problem that he and other advocates of tax accrual
with interest have ignored is the fact that cumulative averaging would
make the government a willing lender to anyone who wished to borrow
without providing meaningful credit control. Not only would the IRS
have difficulty choosing a proper interest rate for each borrower, but
also many taxpayers who should no longer be extended credit would
borrow. Of course, such borrowings already occur under current law:
taxpayers can enter into tax shelter arrangements, which defer income
and earn no interest for the government.
Even when no interest is charged, there is evidence that many tax-
payers ignore the implicit debt that they are carrying. 227 If tax liabili-
222 See Note, supra note 79, at 872 n.65.
22' For a relatively recent statement of the proposal, see Vickrey, supra note 19,
at 737.
224 For example, assume a taxpayer pays $1,000 of tax in Year 1. If a 10% inter-
est rate is used, then in Year 2, the taxpayer will be deemed to have $100 of income
and $100 of tax paid.
225 See M. GRAETZ, supra note 10, at 341-42.
228 See Vickrey, supra note 19, at 745-47. Most troublesome, in his view, would
appear to be the problems raised by changes in marital or jurisdictional status.
227 For example, this problem arose in the case of taxpayers who engaged in com-
modity tax straddles. When Congress closed that method of deferral in 1981, see Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 501-08, 95 Stat. 172, 323-33,
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ties were accrued with explicit interest, so that a taxpayer's debt grew
over time, we could expect taxpayers to lack the money to pay the debt
in many more circumstances.228 For this reason, this proposal has at-
tempted to limit those cases in which taxpayers could postpone tax lia-
bilities rather than pay them immediately.
To what extent must the accrual system expand allowed deferral
of tax liabilities to take account of liquidity problems? A recent survey
of consumer finances by the Federal Reserve Board and other federal
agencies229 provides useful data for calculating liquidity. In analyzing
this data, I have disregarded assets that the accrual system described in
this paper would never require individuals to value and pay tax on,
such as personal residences and retirement savings. Table 2 shows the
liquidity of different income groups as calculated from the survey
data.230 Of the total population, 2.28% hold only nonliquid assets,
the problems that arose for those who finally had to pay their tax debts led to special
legislation to ease the burden of the tax payments. See id. at § 509, 95 Stat. at 333.
The legislation allowed the tax on what was, in effect, accumulated deferred income to
be paid in installments over as many as five years. As of April 15, 1982, the due date of
1981 tax returns, that liability did accrue interest.
228 Of course, creating the liability in the context of appreciating assets is less
severe a problem than under Vickrey's proposal because the appreciating asset itself
provides some security. Moreover, any decrease in its value will produce a tax benefit;
however, the increased value may not cover the interest obligation that is accruing, nor
is there any check on the possibility that taxpayers might use the property as explicit
security for other loans. Unless the bankruptcy laws were changed in light of changed
tax laws, a secured creditor would have priority over the tax collector in receiving the
proceeds of the sale of the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (Supp. 11 1984) (setting out
order of priority for final distributions in bankruptcy).
An additional problem with Vickrey's cumulative averaging might be noted.
Under his proposal prior years' tax payments are cumulated in an account on which
the taxpayer receives interest. This "interest" becomes part of the taxpayer's income for
the year, but it is also included as a payment of tax for the year. Vickrey's tax tables
are constructed on the premise that individuals "should" be taxed as if their incomes
have been earned ratably throughout their working careers. For the best description of
the details of the plan, see W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 417-
22 (1947). The result is that when a taxpayer's income decreases, the taxpayer receives
a refund; most taxpayers who retire would thus receive refunds through their retire-
ment years. One effect of such a tax system is likely to be a major shift of the tax
burden from older to younger taxpayers. This shift may be politically possible only if
older taxpayers receive a comparable detriment, such as the abolition of the Social Se-
curity system as we know it.
229 For a description of the survey, see Avery, Elliehausen & Canner, Survey of
Consumer Finances, 1983, 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 679 (1984). Use of this survey
data probably exaggerates the liquidity problem, since "sample surveys of financial
assets generally yield figures lower than those derived from macroeconomic data." R.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 47, at 117 n.1.
20 The values in table 2 were calculated from the responses to the survey, copies
of which were acquired from the Federal Reserve. See Avery, Elliehausen & Canner,
supra note 229, at 690 n.13. For purposes of this calculation, liquid assets include
checking accounts, certificates of deposit, money market accounts, passbook savings ac-
counts, federal and corporate bonds, traded securities, and gold and silver bullion. Illiq-
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while the liquid assets held by an additional 7.69% of the population
comprise less than 5% of these individuals' total assets. For higher per-
centages of liquidity, the percentage of families with liquidity problems
drops off. At first glance, the fact that about 10% of the population
have less than 5% liquidity seems troubling; however, a more careful
examination of the responses of 357 families who fit into that cate-
gory231 reveals that, for many of them, no serious problems are likely to
arise.
uid assets include notes, land contracts, real estate (including other residential units in a
multi-family structure in which the respondent lives), closely-held businesses, interests
in trusts, surrender value of life insurance policies, and miscellaneous assets (including
works of art and other collectibles). While the surrender value of life insurance policies
is liquid in the sense that it would be easy to convert it into cash, it seemed unlikely
that one would want taxpayers to surrender their life insurance policies to pay their
income taxes.
231 Twenty-four of the respondents with less than 5% liquidity gave no informa-
tion about income, and they have been disregarded for purposes of this analysis.
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Within this category of families holding a large percentage of illiq-
uid assets fall several groups of individuals who would not be expected
to have serious liquidity problems:
1. Individuals who hold relatively few assets. Consider a
taxpayer with $5,000 of income and $10,000 of illiquid as-
sets. On average, assets increase in value in one year by
about 4.5%.232 A 4.5% increase in this person's illiquid assets
would result in $450 of additional income. One would expect
the individual's tax rate to be about 12.5%,233 which would
result in a tax of $56.25 on the increased value, about 1.1%
of the individual's income and only about 0.5% of the total
value of the assets. Thus, anyone with income of $5,000 who
owns $10,000 of illiquid assets would probably not have se-
rious liquidity problems under the proposal. In general, I
assume that persons with income below $10,000 could pay
up to 2% of their incomes as additional taxes; those with
$10,000 to $50,000 of income could pay up to 4%; and those
with over $50,000 of income could pay up to 6%.
2. Individuals who have illiquid assets that do not vary
greatly in value. If illiquid assets are not particularly vola-
tile, a taxpayer will not normally experience problems in
paying a tax on the changes in value of such assets. The
illiquid assets that could be considered not volatile include
notes, land contracts, and insurance policies.2"4
3. Individuals who have an interest in a closely held busi-
ness comprising their major illiquid asset. The data alone
do not tell us whether persons in this group will have liquid-
ity problems. Two facts may result in their illiquidity not
being of concern. First, to the extent their closely held busi-
nesses are incorporated, gains and losses will be taxed only
on realization.235 Second, someone with a controlling interest
in a closely held corporation will have access to the liquid
assets held in that entity. Thus, persons with substantial
232 See infra Appendix B.
233 See infra Appendix B table (tax rates).
23 The category that includes insurance policies also includes other assets, such as
interests in trust, but it seems unlikely that those assets would change the conclusion in
the text for many taxpayers.
235 See supra text accompanying note 93. To the extent the corporations are S
corporations, the liquidity problems their shareholders face should be little different
from the liquidity problems they currently face. Under existing law, S corporation
shareholders are taxed on the income of the corporation whether or not the corporation
makes any distribution to the shareholders.
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business assets may not have liquidity problems.
An examination of the data in light of these further considerations
reveals that the problem of liquidity decreases.substantially. Table C-2
of Appendix C shows that, if one assumes a 4.5% annual appreciation
rate for assets and disregards persons in the three categories above, less
than 0.9% of the population has liquidity problems. Alternatively,
under the liberal assumption of 13% appreciation-a rate higher than
the appreciation in any year in the period 1961-1984 236-only about
2% of the population have liquidity problems.2 37 Even under the as-
sumption of 25% appreciation, which is almost twice the appreciation
for any year in the period 1961 to 1984, persons with potential liquid-
ity problems number only about 3.25%.2"'
Should tax policymakers worry about such persons? Because peo-
ple with liquidity problems include only those holding investment or
business assets that (at least assuming a 4.5% rate of appreciation) sub-
stantially exceed their incomes,2" 9 one might conclude that those people
should pay a somewhat greater percentage of their income in taxes in
order to solve their liquidity problems. Moreover, those persons should
be in a very good position to borrow in order to pay their taxes in a
year of significant increase in the value of their assets. About two-thirds
of the persons identified as having liquidity problems in table C-2
(those with over $20,000 of income) have over $200,000 of assets. 40
Unless these persons have already fully encumbered their assets, they
should be able to borrow whatever they need to pay taxes before they
sell the property. Finally, if taxpayers know that they will have to pay
a tax on appreciation in value, not just on realization, they are likely to
change their portfolios to take that tax scheme into account.
This ability of taxpayers to respond to the tax system is the lesson
of the estate tax, under which similar liquidity problems potentially
arise. Professor James D. Smith241 and the staff of the Iowa Law Re-
view 242 attempt to measure liquidity in connection with the estate tax.
Analyzing data from estate tax returns filed in 1973, Professor Smith
2286 For a discussion of the calculation of annual appreciation, see infra Appendix
B.
237 See infra Appendix C, table C-3.
238 See infra Appendix C, table 0-4.
239 See infra Appendix C, table C-1.
240 See id.
241 See Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, Public Hearings and Panel Discussions
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1309-32 (1976)
(testimony of James D. Smith) [hereinafter cited as Estate Tax Hearings].
242 See Contemporary Studies Project: Large Farm Estate Planning and Probate
in Iowa, 59 IOWA L. REV. 794, 928-30, & apps. E, H, 0, P & S (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Iowa Study].
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calculates the ratio of the estate tax plus costs on the one hand, to liq-
uid assets minus debts on the other. He uses this measure to indicate
the extent to which estates might be forced to sell illiquid assets to pay
the estate tax. The data showed that, for all estates, only 5.8% had
ratios of one or more; that is, for only 5.8% of all estates would taxpay-
ers find it necessary to sell illiquid assets to pay the estate tax.24
Professor Smith performs a separate calculation for estates that
contained some farm or noncorporate business assets.244 Of those es-
tates, 12.1% had ratios of tax plus costs to liquid assets minus debts
totaling one or more, with an additional 4.2% having ratios between
three-quarters and one.24 5 Thus, according to these figures, about 16%
of estates with farm or noncorporate property face potential liquidity
problems.
The effect of a tax system that requires tax payments even from
persons holding illiquid assets can be seen by comparing Professor
Smith's data with data from the study of Iowa farms conducted by the
Iowa Law Review. The Iowa study indicated that an average of 25% of
the gross estates of farmers who had died consisted of liquid assets,
while for living farmers the comparable figure was 9.5%.*246 As the
study concludes, this difference may well result from actions taken by
farmers (or their attorneys) prior to death in order to facilitate payment
of the estate tax.2 47 Thus, taxpayers seem quite capable of adjusting
their financial affairs to meet tax needs.
How should the accrual system handle those taxpayers who would
still encounter liquidity problems? Even under current law, despite the
24s See Estate Tax Hearings, supra note 241, at 1320 table 6. Smith made the
same calculation excluding those estates that included in the gross estate assets that the
decedent had transferred within three years of death, see I.R.C. § 2035 (1982). Only
4.4% of the estates in that group had ratios of one or more. See Estate Tax Hearings,
supra note 241, at 1321 table 7.
244 See Estate Tax Hearings, supra note 241, at 1321, text accompanying table 6.
Professor Smith emphasized that category of assets because he had been directed to
consider "the problem of liquidity in the estates of decedents, particularly those with
small businesses, business and farm assets." Id. at 1309. He did not attempt to distin-
guish stock of closely held corporations from other corporate stock, and thus no investi-
gation was made of the liquidity problems of owners of closely held corporations. Ac-
cording to Professor Smith's data, 2.3% of the gross assets of all estates consisted of
farm and noncorporate business assets, as compared to 22.6% of gross assets for real
estate, the largest category of nonliquid assets. See id. at 1320 table 5. Presumably, the
high percentage for real estate reflects, to a significant degree, owner-occupied homes
included in estates.
145 See id. at 1320 table 6. The comparable percentages when estates with lifetime
transfers are excluded are 11.6% and 4.1%. See id. at 1321 table 7.
246 See Iowa Study, supra note 242, at 929.
247 See id. at 930.
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various withholding rules that promote current payment of taxes,2 48
taxpayers may have insufficient funds to pay their tax liabilities. When
that happens, the taxpayer must work out an arrangement with the
IRS to provide for the prompt payment of the tax liability.249
If, however, prudent policy requires an accrual system that does
not create liquidity problems for any taxpayers, other approaches could
be devised. For example, we could adapt the rule that grants an estate
an extension of time to pay the estate tax when the estate consists
largely of an interest in a closely held business. 50 This solution,
though, assumes that preference should be given to taxpayers in such
situations because the income from the illiquid assets in question cannot
cover the relatively high estate tax, which applies to the full value of
those assets. In contrast, because the accrual system taxes only changes
in value, it need not show similar sympathy.
The accrual tax system should not encourage taxpayers to create
liquidity problems; otherwise, it would simply develop a new goal for
tax lawyers. On the other hand, the accrual system should not, as an
initial matter, penalize taxpayers with liquidity problems. One compro-
mise would require taxpayers to pay at least a certain percentage of
their income, excluding their accrued gains, as a tax on those accrued
gains. For those who would have tax liabilities exceeding that percent-
age, and who could demonstrate that liquidity problems existed for
them,2 1 the system might have to provide for interest-bearing tax lia-
bilities. To discourage persons from borrowing from the government at
rates that might well be unavailable to them in the private debt market,
the interest rate should be set at a level that would prove unattractive to
most taxpayers. After all, they could borrow from someone other than
the government to pay their taxes. For those who would qualify for this
deferred payment scheme, the IRS could make individual arrangements
that would allow it to monitor repayments.
IV. EXTENSION OF THE ACCRUAL SYSTEM TO
ACCOUNT FOR INFLATION
The previous two sections have developed a proposal for an ac-
crual tax system that addresses the valuation and liquidity problems.
28 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3402(a) (1982).
249 See, e.g. I.R.C. § 6161 (1982).
250 See id. at § 6166.
21" The Code includes a limited test of liquidity for purposes of deferring payment
of the estate tax, see id., and such a test has been suggested as a requirement for any
more general estate tax deferral provision. See Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1270 (1983).
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An extension of the proposed system could give rise to a major benefit
beyond those inherent in the system proposed thus far. A tax system
that taxes changes in the value of assets (whether on accrual or realiza-
tion) but does not account for inflation imposes an "inflation tax" on
taxpayers whose assets appreciate in value; that is, the system taxes the
increase in an asset's value due to inflation as well as increases due to
other causes. Because an accrual system would already require taxpay-
ers to record the value of assets each year, taxpayers could relatively
easily adjust the income earned on those assets for inflation. In order to
make such an adjustment, a taxpayer would simply multiply the sum of
the values of all assets at the end of the previous year by the appropri-
ate inflation rate.252 The taxpayer would then subtract that amount (or
some percentage of that amount) from income.
Of course, like other proposals that have been made to adjust for
inflation,253 the accrual system would have to adjust liabilities as well
as assets, thus creating more income for debtor taxpayers in times of
inflation. Because taxpayers would already have to compute many asset
and liability values, they could make an inflation adjustment for debt
simply by netting the value of their debt against the value of their total
assets before making the inflation adjustment. The problem with this
method, however, is that the system does not include all assets and lia-
bilities. In particular, the proposed accrual system excludes mortgages
and consumer debt, which comprise about two-thirds of all debt held by
individuals.
254
Despite the problem posed by debt excluded from the accrual sys-
tem, adjustments for inflation need not, and should not, ignore liabili-
ties. From a debtor taxpayer's perspective, adjusting the value of debt
for inflation would decrease the deductions the taxpayer could take ei-
ther on the interest owed on the debt or on the inflation portion of
gains on assets; that is, the inflation adjustment for debt, unlike the
adjustment for assets, would increase taxable income.
The system would not have to force a taxpayer to value debt in
order to take this inflation effect into account. Instead, the system could
allow the taxpayer to deduct interest payments based on the real rate of
252 There is controversy over which inflation rate to use. See, e.g., Aaron, Infla-
tion and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAx 1,
15-16 (H. Aaron ed. 1976) (discussing various inflation indices and their limitations).
Using the GNP deflator, I calculate that allowing inflation adjustments will decrease
the tax base by about 20%. See infra Appendix B.
253 See, e.g., Brinner, Inflation and the Definition of Taxable Personal Income,
in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAx, supra note 252, at 121, 131-32 (advocating
recognition of inflation gains and losses with respect to personal debt and savings).
25 See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26.
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interest rather than the nominal rate. The real interest rate is simply
the stated, or nominal, rate minus the inflation rate. A deduction based
on the real interest rate would effectively reflect an inflation adjustment
on the value of the debt.255 Thus, even if a liability would be excluded
from the accrual tax system for purposes of valuation, the interest paid
on that liability should still be adjusted for inflation.
V. TRANSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
No tax reform proposal should avoid discussing how best to
change from the old system to the new one, for the costs of transition
and implementation may-when combined with the other costs of the
new system-outweigh the new system's benefits. Other advocates of an
accrual tax system have considered how to effect a relatively smooth
transition to such a system. Generally, they propose taxing only gains
and losses accrued after the new system becomes effective, although
they vary in their methods to deal with any gain or loss that accrued
before that time.
David and Miller,256 for example, offer a number of possibilities:
taxing accrued gains as of the date of enactment at the favorable capital
gains rates rather than the ordinary income rates that would apply af-
ter that date; spreading forward for ten years the tax on the previously
accrued gains with forgiveness of further taxes due if the taxpayer dies
before the end of the ten years; or taxing only a percentage of the previ-
ously accrued gains, reflecting the percentage of gains that taxpayers
ordinarily recognize in a given year. These approaches attempt to en-
courage taxpayers to declare the correct value in the current year, by
making the resulting tax low, so that taxpayers can avoid a higher tax
once the accrual tax is fully implemented. David and Miller also raise
the possibility of phasing in the full taxation of accrued capital gains by
.5 For example, in a world with 10% inflation, a taxpayer with an asset worth
$1000 at the beginning of the year and $1200 at the end of the year and a $100 debt
with a $15 annual interest payment will pay taxes on $95 of income regardless of
whether the debt or the interest is adjusted for inflation.
If the debt is adjusted, its face value is netted against the $1000 asset value to give
a preadjustment value of $900, see supra text accompanying note 252. Multiplying this
by a 10% inflation figure gives a $90 inflation offset against the $200 rise in asset
value. The taxpayer's taxable income is $110. Once the $15 interest deduction is taken,
tax is owed on $95.
If the interest is adjusted, the taxpayer can deduct only $5 of interest, since the
real interest rate on the debt is 5%. The inflation offset on the asset, without netting out
the debt, is $100 ($1000 X 10%), which is subtracted from the $200 of income from
the rise in value of the asset to give $100 of taxable income. Once the $5 interest
deduction is taken, tax is again owed on $95.
.56 See David & Miller, supra note 78, at 4286.
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allowing progressively smaller deductions for them over a three year
transition period.
The Commission to Revise the Tax Structure deals summarily
with the transition issue in its proposal. It simply notes that prior gains
could be excluded from the system, without indicating how or when
these gains would be treated. The Commission also suggests, like David
and Miller, that if prior gains were taxed, the tax might be spread
forward to avoid a major burden on taxpayers during the transition. 57
One of the proposals to tax only stock appreciation on an accrual
basis suggests several possible transition strategies. For example, the
system could tax the difference between basis and transition year fair
market value in the year the taxpayer sells or exchanges stock.25 An-
other alternative would allow taxpayers to elect to spread the tax on
some percentage, say 50%, of the pre-transition accrued gain over a
period of perhaps five years after the accrual system is introduced. This
alternative would allow the taxpayer to increase basis by 20% of the
gain in each year, so that after five years a full basis step-up would be
achieved although only half the gain would be taxed. 59 This approach
would encourage taxpayers to go on the accrual system. Yet another
alternative would accrue the tax liability, with interest, and would re-
quire taxpayers to pay the tax only upon sale or other transfer.2"'
These transition rules aim in part to prevent changes in the tax
law from frustrating expectations. Professor Graetz argues that such a
goal is inappropriate.26 ' Policymakers who remain concerned with frus-
trating expectations may nevertheless conclude that no remedial action
is necessary, because immediate transition to an accrual system should
not be disruptive. The system proposed in this Article covers most as-
sets (the major exceptions are homes and consumer durables) either di-
rectly, or through a mechanism (taxation of gain on realization and
adjustments for deferral) intended to yield results substantially
equivalent to accrual. As a result, the relative advantages of investing in
different types of assets may be affected very little. While homes and
consumer durables might at first appear more attractive than they are
under current law, it must be kept in mind once again that expanding
the base for taxation under the proposed system would permit a de-
257 See COMMISSION TO REVISE, supra note 30, at 40.
258 See Note, supra note 79, at 873.
259 See id. at 873 n.72.
260 See id. at 872 n.65.
281 See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revi-
sion, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 63-87 (1977) (arguing that the effective date of new
legislation should not be delayed for either fairness or efficiency reasons).
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crease in tax rates generally.262 With lower rates, the advantage under
current law of investing in consumption items would lose some of its
value. Moreover, because the gains on owner-occupied houses and con-
sumer durables constitute a very small part of the present tax base263
the change to an accrual system, which excludes these assets, would
probably not frustrate taxpayers' expectations very much.
Perhaps a more significant effect of moving to an accrual tax sys-
tem would be the change that could occur in the relative values of assets
that produce recognized gain on a relatively short-term basis compared
to those that usually represent long-term investment. Assets currently
viewed as short-term investments should become relatively more attrac-
tive once the accrual system taxes increases in the values of all assets
yearly. Nevertheless, the major category of assets that produces dispro-
portionate amounts 2U of short-term gains and losses, futures contracts
262 See infra Appendix B.
263 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying
notes 152-53; infra Appendix A, table A-5.
26 The extent to which futures contracts produce disproportionate amounts of
short-term gains and losses can be seen from the following table, which is derived from
1973 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 129, at 69-96 table 5. The precise category
that I have labeled "futures contracts" is what the IRS report calls "Commodities,
Including Futures Contracts." Nevertheless, the definition of that category indicates
that, in the case of commodities themselves, "Islales resulted from an obligation to buy
or sell a fixed quantity of a commodity on a specific date at a fixed price." Id. at 5.
Thus, sales of actual commodities that could be treated as capital transactions were
sales made in compliance with a futures contract. Because under current law the gain
or loss on the contract itself would have to be recognized on accrual, see I.R.C. § 1256
(1982 & Supp. II 1984), most gains or losses on actual commodities do not receive
capital treatment under current law, see id. §§ 1231-1244 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
Gains & Losses from Selected Categories of Capital Assets, 1973
% of % of % of % of % of
Total Gross Gross Gross Gross
Category Net CG STCG STCL LTCG LTCL
Commodities 1.1 26.0 29.8 1.5 0.9
Corp. Stock 36.0 32.3 30.8 25.8 58.9
Share of pship.
and fiduciary




residences) 22.3 3.2 0.2 8.3 1.7
Debt (other than
U.S. & Local) 3.5 0.4 3.8 0.2 1.5
Miscellaneous 27.9 23.9 24.6 12.2 24.2
The percentages of total net gain in the table are somewhat misleading, because
their size depends not only on the general significance of the category among all capital
transactions but also on the extent to which taxable capital transactions in that category
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and other short-term securities, would receive a matching detriment:
the system would eliminate their current favorable rate of tax,265 since
the system would tax all gain and loss as ordinary income. Moreover,
the relative benefit of investing under the proposed system as opposed
to current law is not easy to gauge. Coupled with the proposal to tax
gain on accrual is a provision allowing full immediate deduction for
accrued losses. Although investors tend to be optimists anyway, this
provision should encourage people to undertake more risky investments
in both long- and short-term debt.
There is also a transition problem in implementing the system:
how would the IRS get people to catalogue all their assets in the first
year this system is used? It may be possible to use data the IRS already
has from tax returns and other information filed with it to create a
preliminary listing of taxpayer assets. Because taxpayers currently
must list dividends and interest by payor, and must list and describe
certain real property investments, it might be possible for the IRS to
begin the process for taxpayers by sending to them a listing of the as-
sets of which it is aware. The taxpayer would then be required to sup-
plement the list with all the assets that the IRS did not include.
Indeed, if an accrual system were adopted, Congress might seri-
ously consider having the IRS generally take the first step in filling out
individual tax returns. Although it would undoubtedly need a substan-
tial initial investment, the IRS could acquire the capability of keeping
track of assets that a taxpayer listed in the previous year, and then
sending out lists with current year values for such assets. 66 The tax-
are profitable. Since the total of gains and losses in futures transactions are roughly the
same, they are only a small portion of the total of net gains on all capital transactions.
In contrast, real estate, which is sold disproportionately at a profit, comprises a larger
percentage of total net gains.
What is most telling in this table is the extent to which transactions in commodi-
ties futures are taxed on a short-term basis. It is particularly noteworthy that they play
such a large role in tax-disfavored short-term capital gains, compared with their rela-
tively small portion of total tax-favored long-term capital gains.
""8 Under I.R.C. § 1256(a)(3) (1982), 60% of the gain on such contracts are
deemed long-term even if the contract is not held for the long-term holding period. It is
true that the provision also makes 60% of losses long-term even if the futures are held
for less than the long-term holding period, and that virtually all losses on commodities
were short-term under the prior tax regime. See supra note 264. From the standpoint
of the investor, however, gains are presumably expected more than losses, and thus the
advantage on the gain side should more than compensate for the detriment on the loss
side.
28 If this approach were taken, either the valuation process for this purpose
would have to take place prior to the end of the year-perhaps on September 30-or
tax returns would normally become due after April 15. Otherwise, there would not be
enough time for the IRS to compile all the necessary data and get it to taxpayers in a
timely fashion. Early valuation should create no problems as long as purchases and
sales after the valuation date are not under the system in that year. The problem with
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payer would then revise the listings for those assets sold during the
year. This procedure could substantially ease the administrative burden
on taxpayers in complying with the system.
One additional advantage of a system in which the IRS keeps
records for taxpayers in this manner is that if the IRS collected data
about an individual's assets, it would become harder for people to hide
their capital income. Of course, that fact could induce people to attempt
to hide their assets from the IRS. The IRS would probably discover
such deception, however, when it made a final accounting at the time
the taxpayer's will is probated.
This procedure raises the question of whether an accrual system
would entrust the IRS with too much information about taxpayers. It
also raises the question of whether the move away from a pure self-
assessment system is desirable. Neither question should be answered
quickly. In considering them, however, one should note the extent to
which Congress has recently increased filing requirements in the
Code.28 7 This practice has inevitably led to an increase in the informa-
tion that the IRS can marshall about individual taxpayers, and to a
decrease in the self-assessment nature of the tax system. Perhaps it
would be wise to confront both these issues directly under an accrual
system rather than have the changes occur piecemeal.268 Moreover, the
potential increase in compliance may raise in the minds of some the
significance of the invasion of privacy inherent in the suggested system.
It is just as well to consider that sooner rather than later.
purchases was discussed previously. See supra note 82. Essentially the same problems
arise for sales. If sales after the valuation date could be taken into account in the year
of sale, there would be planning opportunities for taxpayers, who could decide whether
to sell assets that have changed in price between the valuation date and the end of the
year. The result of using a September 30 date for assets on the accrual system would be
a tax return encompassing two different taxable years-the calendar year for earnings
and a fiscal year for asset gains and losses. Because this structure seems awkward, a
delayed filing date may be preferable. In light of the structure that exists in the Code
for keeping taxpayers up-to-date on their tax payments throughout the year, this
method should not affect collections substantially.
2617 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6041A (1982 & West Supp. 1986) (reporting requirements
for payments of remuneration of services and direct sales); id. § 6053(c) (1982 & West
Supp. 1986) (reporting requirements for tips received); id. § 6050I(a) (Supp. 11 1984)
(reporting requirements for cash receipts of more than $10,000).
268 I am aware of only one recent article that considers the privacy issue in the
context of enforcement of the tax law. See Miller, Tax Compliance Versus Individual
Privacy: A Conflict Between Social Objectives, in INCOME COMPLIANCE: A REPORT OF





This Article has developed a specific proposal for structuring and
implementing an accrual tax system. Under this proposal, gains and
losses on investment assets would be taxed to individuals at ordinary
income rates in the year the gains or losses accrue. Some as-
sets-notably owner-occupied residences and inexpensive consumer
items-would be excluded from the system completely. Items that are
particularly difficult to value-notably closely held stock and col-
lectibles-would be taxed only on realization, but with an adjustment
to the final gain or loss that is intended to compensate for the fact that
interim gains and losses were not taxed annually. The realization rules
for such assets, however, would not include all the special nonrecogni-
tion rules of current law. Certain business assets-notably inventories,
accounts receivable, and depreciable personal property-could be in-
cluded in the system through modified versions of current law already
applied to them that approximate accrual taxation. Other intangible
business assets-good will and going concern value-would not be
treated on an accrual basis. Business and investment liabilities would
generally be incorporated in the system.
The advantages of the proposed system are numerous. The propo-
sal could lead to an elimination of the corporate tax system and allow
us to include inflation adjustments in the tax system without difficulty.
The changes outlined above would enable the excision of a substantial
portion of the Internal Revenue Code. Although there would be an
added cost due to the need to keep track of current assets and their
values for all taxpayers, the IRS can be expected to handle that work
efficiently.
An accrual tax system should be seriously considered as a means
of simplifying the tax law, a primary goal of tax reform. How is such a
system simpler than current law? It is simpler for those who measure
the complexity of the Code by its size. It is simpler for those who mea-
sure the complexity of the Code by the ambiguity of its interpretation.
Valuation would be the only ambiguity introduced by the system into
the streamlined Code, and most of the valuation methods suggested
above are purely objective and allow for no controversy in regard to
most assets. Finally, an accrual system is simpler-vastly simpler-for
those who measure the complexity of the Code by the possibilities for
tax-motivated business planning that it presents.
The argument that this system is not simple must come from two
other measures of complexity: recordkeeping complexity, and complex-
ity for those who confront the Code mainly through forms and instruc-
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tions. For those in the latter group-generally lower income taxpayers
with few if any assets that are affected by the system-the impact of an
accrual system may not be great. The extent to which they are affected
depends on the extent to which recordkeeping requirements would be
increased for those taxpayers who are affected by the accrual system.
Given the difficulty of reconstructing basis after many years of holding
an asset, which commentators documented at great length and in great
detail in the controversy over carryover basis,2"9 a tax reformer can rea-
sonably ask whether the system outlined above, with assistance in com-
pliance provided by the IRS, could be any more difficult to comply
with conscientiously than the current realization system. If I am correct
in thinking that it would not be, we need no longer consider a con-
sumption tax the only real alternative to our current income tax system.
We should make accrual taxation the next item on our agenda for ma-
jor tax reform.
289 See, e.g., Estate and Gift Tax Problems Arising from the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of




THE MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUALLY HELD ASSETS
Data on the values of all assets held by individuals are necessarily
approximate. The figures used throughout this Article are based on ta-
bles compiled by the Federal Reserve Board.' In addition, this Article
has referred to tables compiled by Raymond W. Goldsmith.2 The data
in these two sources are not wholly consistent, and I discuss some of the
significant differences in footnotes in the body of the Article.
The tables published by the Federal Reserve are not perfectly
suited for the analysis in this Article. While the tables reflect current
values of tangible assets and traded securities, they list debts-whether
assets or liabilities-at their face amounts. Fortunately, recent work on
debt valuation facilitates the conversion of par values to market values
for many categories of debt instruments listed in the Federal Reserve
tables. Eisner and Pieper have developed such adjustments for the gov-
ernment sector of the balance sheets.3 Strong has done the same for the
nonfinancial corporate sector.4 I have based my conversions of par val-
ues in the balance sheets to market values on these earlier works.' In
1 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., BALANCE SHEETS FOR
THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1945-1984 (1985) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL RESERVE BAL-
ANCE SHEETS]. I supplemented the information in this source using various supporting
tables furnished to me by Elizabeth Fogler at the Federal Reserve, copies of which are
on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
2 See R. GOLDSMITH, THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1953-1980 (1982).
1 See Eisner & Pieper, A View of the Federal Debt and Budget Deficits, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 11, 12-14 (1984). The data I have used in this Article include updated
material through 1984 furnished to me by Pieper. These revisions are available in R.
EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT? 205 (1986).
' See J. Strong, The Market Valuation of Credit Market Debt (Nov. 1985) (re-
view draft) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). The paper
includes data through 1983. I approximated the figure for 1984 by comparing the fluc-
tuations of the rate for nonresidential mortgages that Strong provides through 1983
with the rate for residential mortgages that Eisner and Pieper furnish through 1984.
5 I have converted from par to market values data from six Federal Reserve ta-
bles. See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 1, at 16-25 table 702
(households-'H'); id. at 26-30 table 703 (farms-'F'); id. at 31-35 table 704 (non-
farm, noncorporate business-'NN'). These three tables are combined in the "Assets
and Liabilities of Individuals" balance sheets, table 707, which is on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review. I have adjusted data from the tables dealing with
"Life Insurance Companies' Assets and Liabilities" ('LI'), "Private Pension Funds'
Assets and Liabilities" ('PP'), and "State and Local Governments Retirement Funds'
Assets and Liabilities" ('FL') to correct the data on lines 29 and 30 of the household
balance sheets.
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my analysis, I utilize annual conversion factors for the following seven
categories of assets and liabilities:6 total U.S. debt,7 U.S. notes,' U.S.
notes and bonds (weighted average),' state and local bonds, 0 corporate
bonds, 1 home mortgages, 12 and nonresidential mortgages. 3
For purposes of this Article, the remaining imprecisions in the
data should not affect the final conclusions significantly; these impreci-
sions should nevertheless be identified. The par-to-market conversions
used are not always a perfect match for the data being adjusted. It is
not always clear, for example, whether the home mortgage or the non-
residential mortgage index should be used for various categories of
mortgages. Indeed, in some cases it might be appropriate to use a com-
bination of the two mortgage indices. Still, the correct index can easily
be applied to the main category that is significant for individu-
als-home mortgages.
Some of the data were not amenable to any of the existing conver-
sions to market value. A particular asset of note is tax-exempt securi-
ties, listed as an obligation on the Federal Reserve's household balance
sheets (line 39 of table 702). This category encompasses student loans
taken out by individuals and certain obligations of nonprofit organiza-
tions, such as hospitals. Using data on new issuances of these two cate-
gories of debt, I calculate the amount of outstanding debt that could be
6 The first four and the sixth factors are from Eisner & Pieper, supra note 3, at
12-16. The seventh factor is from J. Strong, supra note 4, at 7 table 5. The fifth factor
is the average price of all New York Stock Exchange listed bonds as recorded in NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK (1985). Eisner and Pieper modify this index to
exclude foreign bonds. Telephone interview with Paul J. Pieper, Assistant Professor of
Economics, University of Illinois (Jan. 2, 1986). Strong modifies it to exclude debt of
nonfinancial corporations. Telephone interview with John Strong, Professor of Eco-
nomics, School of Business Administration, College of William and Mary (Dec. 11,
1985).
7 This factor was used to convert H20 (that is, line 20 of the Household Balance
Sheets, "Other Treasury Issues"); L16, PP7, and SL6 (all labeled "Treasury Issues").
See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 1.
8 This factor was used to convert H19 (Savings Bonds). See id.
9 This factor was used to convert H21, L17, PP8, and SL7 (all labeled "Agency
Issues"). See id.
'0 This factor was used to convert H22 (State & Local Obligations) and L18 and
SL8 (both labeled "Tax-Exempt Obligations"). See id.
11 This factor was used to convert H23 (Corporate and Foreign Bonds); F18
(U.S. Government Loans); F19 (Federal Intermediate Credit Bank Loans); L19, PP9,
and SL9 (all labeled "Corporate and Foreign Bonds"). See id.
12 This factor was used to convert H25 (Mortgages (assets)), H37 (Home Mort-
gages (liabilities)), H39 (Tax-exempt Securities (liabilities)), and F15 (Mortgages (lia-
bilities)). See id.
"3This factor was used to convert H38 (Other Mortgages (liabilities)); NN16
(Mortgages (liabilities)); LI10, PP10, and SL10 (all labeled "Mortgages" (assets)). See
id.
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attributed to individuals. 4 I then use this figure in the tables, without
further adjustment."5
An additional problem inherent in the Federal Reserve's data on
"individuals" is that they include data on nonprofit organizations.
Many of the assets of nonprofit organizations are identified as such on
the asset side of the balance sheets; these I have removed from my totals
for individuals. 6 On the liability side, however, I have not been able to
remove the liabilities of nonprofit organizations, except in the case of
"tax-exempt securities."
I have not attempted to adjust all assets and liabilities listed on the
balance sheets at par value. In the case of liabilities, I have generally
assumed that consumer credit, trade credit, and miscellaneous loans are
of a sufficiently short-term nature that their value is quite close to their
face amount. On the asset side, I have made the same assumption re-
garding all bank deposits and money-market shares, although an argu-
ment could be made that large time-deposits, at least, should be
adjusted.
Furthermore, I have not attempted to adjust life-insurance policy
loans of individuals, though they could be discounted significantly.
These loans appear as assets on the balance sheets of life insurance
1' Treasury Department data on new issuances from 1975-1984 were supplied to
me by Laura Rubin of the Capital Markets Group of the Federal Reserve (copy on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). It appears that prior to 1975 virtu-
ally all bond issues in this category were for the benefit of nonprofit entities rather than
for student loans. To determine the level of debt outstanding, I add issuances in the
current year to the prior year's level of debt and compare that figure to the balance
sheets' figures for current year debt levels. The difference reflects repayments in the
current year. To simplify calculations, I assume that repayments were made pro rata
between the two categories of debt based on prior year levels of debt outstanding. I
make no attempt to compensate for the possible differences in the age of the two catego-
ries of debt or for any differences that may exist in the maturities of the two types of
debt. Adjusting for those calculated repayments, I am able to estimate the amount of
tax-exempt debt attributable to individuals.
15 Student loans might have been identified specially for adjustment in my calcula-
tions, since data does exist on net annual student loans made. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 166 table 269 ("Major Federal Student Financial Assistance Programs")
(1984). Those amounts substantially exceed the amounts in the balance sheets' lines for
tax-exempt loans. Because such loans are often subsidized in one way or another, a
precise attempt to adjust par values to market values in the balance sheets might well
account for that difference, though Eisner and Pieper apparently choose not to do so,
see R. EISNER, supra note 3, at 212. In any event, the treatment proposed for the
valuation of loans, see supra text accompanying notes 71-72, would not impose a new
tax on the initial benefit of a subsidized loan, but would tax only the change in value of
the loans.
" I subtract from the balance sheet of individuals the data in H5 (Nonprofit In-
stitutions' Residential Structures), H6 (Nonprofit Plant & Equipment), and H10
(Nonprofit Institutions' Land). See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note
1, at 16-25 table 702.
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companies, and about 90% of the assets of life insurance companies are
recorded on the asset side of the balance sheets of individuals as life
insurance and pension reserves. Thus, for any $100 policy loan listed
as a liability on the balance sheets of individuals, there will be $90 of
assets on those same balance sheets. Accordingly, the failure to adjust
life insurance policy loans has little effect on the net assets of individu-
als. Because owner-occupied homes receive favored treatment under the
proposal in this paper, I must identify them as precisely as possible. I
therefore recharacterize as owner-occupied homes any farm residential
structures that are owner-occupied."7
Table 1 in the text is an adjusted balance sheet for individuals for
1984, based on the Federal Reserve data. 8 The most recent complete
data from Goldsmith's study is for the year 1975. In order to compare
the Federal Reserve figures with Goldsmith's figures, I present in the
first column of table A-1 the comparable Federal Reserve figures for
1975, which, like Goldsmith's data on liabilities, are uncorrected for
market values. To facilitate comparisons with the data in table 1, I also
include in table A-l's third column percentages for comparable catego-
ries, derived by adjusting the Federal Reserve's data for 1975.
17 The information is available through 1979 in BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALY-
sis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FIXED REPRODUCIBLE TANGIBLE WEALTH IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1925-79, at 298 (1982). Data for the years 1980-84 were furnished
to me by Elizabeth Fogler of the Federal Reserve (copy on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review). The Bureau of Economic Analysis makes no separate esti-
mate of the owner-occupied portion of farm land; however, since the owner-occupied
portion of farm land is presumably only a small portion of the value of farm land, no
attempt is made to compensate for that omission.
"a See table 1, supra pp. 1125-26.
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Table A-1
1975 Year-End Balance Sheet of Individuals in the U.S.








Tangible assets 3,225,718 55.3 54.5
Reproducible assets 2,329,283 39.9 39.1
Residential structures 1,252,635 21.5 22.0
Owner-occupied housing 973,777 16.7 17.8
Other 278,858 4.8 4.2
Nonres. plant & equipment 400,583 6.9 5.1
Inventories 91,045 1.6 1.6
Consumer durables 585,020 10.0 10.4
Land 896,435 15.4 15.4
Residential 376,412 6.4 *
Nonresidential 388,047 6.6 *
Vacant 131,976 2.3 *
Total financial assets 2,611,257 44.7 45.5
Demand deposits & currency 189,961 3.3 3.4
Time & savings accounts 766,000 13.1 13.6
Money market fund shares 3,696 0.1 0.1
Securities 925,410 15.9 16.3
U.S. Govt. securities 138,708 2.4 2.5
Savings bonds 67,363 1.2 1.2
Other Treasury issues 58,865 1.0 1.0
Agency issues 12,480 0.2 0.2
State & local obligations 68,061 1.2 1.1
Corporate & foreign bonds 60,865 1.0 1.0
Open-market paper 10,873 0.2 0.2
Corporate equities 646,903 11.1 11.5
Investment co. shares 43,034 0.7 *
Other corporate equities 603,869 10.3 *
Private life insurance res. 158,474 2.7 2.6
Private insured pension res. 72,349 1.2
Private nonins. pension res. 186,593 3.21 6.9
Govt. insur. & pension res. 154,707 2.7
Miscellaneous assets 154,067 2.6 2.7
Total Assets 5,836,975 100.0 100.0
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Table A-1
1975 Year-End Balance Sheet of Individuals in the U.S.
with Tangible Assets at Current Cost
(continued)
Amount % of % of Adj.
Category ($million) Total 1975 Data
Liabilities
Mtgs., owner-occ. nonfarm homes 482,914 8.3 8.5
Noncorp. bus. mortgage debt 248,808 4.3 3.6
Consumer credit 223,175 3.8 4.0
Security credit 12,113 0.2 0.2
Policy loans 25,522 0.4
Other debt 114,896 2.0
Total Liabilities 1,107,428 19.0 18.7
Net Worth 4,729,547 81.0 81.3
* For these items, there is no comparable category in table 1.
Goldsmith tabulates data for three sectors that are relevant to this
Article: households, unincorporated farm businesses, and unincorpo-
rated nonfarm businesses. In table A-2, I aggregate Goldsmith's data
for these sectors to get total asset values and percentages for individuals.
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Table A-2
Structure of Total Individual Balance Sheet, 1975
Amount








Demand deposits & currency
Time & savings deposits
U.S. Government securities
U.S. agency securities
State & local government securities




















































Net Worth (Equity in Enterprise) 83.2 4,897.16
Source: R. GOLDSMITH, THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET OF THE UNITED STATES,
1953-1980, at 118, 149, 156 tables 48, 64, 68 (asset totals) and 120, 150, 158
tables 49, 65, 69 (balance sheets) (1982).
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One of the major advantages of Goldsmith's figures in comparison
to those of the Federal Reserve is that Goldsmith separates the data for
nonprofit entities from the data for households, while the Federal Re-
serve simply includes nonprofits in its household aggregates. Table A-3
displays Goldsmith's figures for the nonprofit sector.
Table A-3
Structure of Balance Sheet of Nonprofit Organizations, 1975
Amount












Demand deposits & currency
Time & Savings deposits
U.S. Government securities
U.S. agency securities
State & local government securities

















Bank loans not elsewhere classified * *
Other loans * *
Consumer credit * *
Open market paper * *
Trade debt 3.3 8.02
Other liabilities * *
Total Liabilities 14.4 34.99
Net Worth 85.6 207.71
Source: R. GOLDSMITH, THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET OF THE UNITED STATES,
1953-1980, at 148 table 63 (1982).
* These categories are irrelevant herein.
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In addition, Goldsmith reproduces data from a study of 1962 asset
holdings, which provide some useful detail regarding individual hold-
ings, particularly in connection with owner-occupied homes and stock-
holdings. These data are contained in table A-4. The underlying study
lists percentages only, not absolute dollar amounts.
Table A-4














































Source: R. GOLDSMITH, THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET OF THE UNITED STATES,
1953-1980, at 137 table 57 (1982) (basic data taken from D. PROJECTOR & G.
WEISS, SURVEY OF FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMERS 110, 118,
130 (1966)).
The previous tables reveal values of assets owned by individuals.
But the primary concern of an accrual system is with changes in asset
values. As I describe more fully in Appendix B, I have used the Fed-
eral Reserve figures to estimate gains accrued by individuals on their
assets. Another way to estimate gains and losses accrued on assets is to
look at data compiled by the Internal Revenue Service on gains and
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losses recognized on capital assets and reflected in individual tax
returns.
The latest study of capital gains reports data from 1973 tax re-
turns. Table A-5 summarizes the data in that study, showing the per-
centage of all transactions, of gross gain, and of gross loss, for each
asset type given.
ACCRUAL TAXATION - APPENDIX
Table A-5
Gains & Losses Recognized by Individuals on Capital Assets, 1973
% of % of % of
Trans- Gross Gross
Asset Type actionsa Gainsb Lossesc
Corporate Stock 53.8 26.1 51.9
U.S. Govt. Obligations 2.2 0.0 0.2
State & Local Govt. Obligations 1.1 0.2 0.7
Other bonds, notes, debentures 1.3 0.2 2.1
Capital Gain Distributions _d 2.4 0.8
Capital Gain or Loss from
Partnerships & Fiduciaries _d 7.7 7.2
Capital Gain Distributions
from Small Business Corps. d 0.8 0.0
Prior-Year Installment Sales 7.0 9.7 0.0
Liquidation Distributions _d 2.6 0.4
Personal Residences 4.8 10.8 -
Nonbusiness Real Property
Except Pers. Residences 4.2 8.1 1.3
Standing Timber 0.3 0.4 0.0
Retirement Plan Distributions _d 1.8 0.0
Commodities and Futures 1.4 2.5 8.2
Invol. Casualty Conversions 1.0 0.1 0.3
Invol. Theft Conversions 0.5 1.0 0.2
Cut Timber (§1231) 0.0 0.1 0.0
Qualified Trade or Bus. Assets
& Transactions not Classified
Elsewhere (§ 1231) 0.9 0.8 1.1
All Other Livestock, except
Poultry, including §1231 Livestock 4.9 3.2 0.2
Other Farm Land with
Unharvested Crop (§1231) 0.4 0.4 0.3
Invol. Conversions not Casualty
or Theft (§1231) 0.8 1.2 0.9
§ 1245 Gainse 5.7 3.9 -
§ 1250 Gainsf  1.0 3.8 -
§ 1251 Gains on Livestock,
except Poultry 0.3 0.2 -
§ 1251 Gains on Farm Land with
Unharvested Crop 0.0 0.1 -
All Other Farm Land (§1252) 0.1 0.3 -
Other Types of Assetsg 11.2 12.7 24.3
Source: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1973, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SALES OF
CAPITAL ASSETS REPORTED ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, SUP-
PLEMENTAL REPORT, 21-34 Table 1 (1980).
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Where "0.0" appears in table, percentage was less than 0.05%.
Where "-" appears in table, the entry was not applicable. But see note d below.
a. The total number of transactions was 16,643,208.
b. The total gross gain was $50,552,376,000.
c. The total gross loss was $15,405,350.
d. Since the IRS reported the number of "transactions" in its tables, distribu-
tions were not included in its totals. There was a total of 2,274,795 distribu-
tions (including allocations of capital gains from partnerships) reported on




Capital Gain Distributions from Mutual
Funds & REITs 57.5
Share of Gain or Loss from
Partnership or Fiduciary 32.3
Capital Gain Distributions from Small
Business Corporations 2.1
Liquidation Distributions 2.3
Retirement Plan Distributions 5.8
Capital gain distributions from mutual funds and REITs reflect additional
gain from publicly traded corporate stock and real estate transactions that is
significant in determining the total mix of recognized gains. Distributions
from small business corporations and the share of gain or loss from partner-
ships and fiduciaries reflect gains and losses from assets of unknown identity
held by those entities. Liquidation distributions from corporations reflect rec-
ognized gains and losses on complete or partial liquidation of corporations.
Capital gain treatment of retirement distributions (including lump sum distri-
butions) reflects favorable treatment granted to such distributions, not a spe-
cial underlying asset of the pension fund.
e. §1245 gain is mostly gain on personal property.
f. §1250 gain is mostly gain on real property.
g. Because the category "Other Assets" includes so many assets, its definition is
worth noting: "This category included mortgages, foreign currency conver-
sions, nonbusiness bad debts, dissolved employee benefit funds, life interest in
estates, cancellations of lease agreements, termination payments to employees,
patents, (including patent royalties), other royalties, and other assets not read-
ily classified elsewhere or specifically identified." INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE, 1973, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SALES OF CAPITAL ASSETS REPORTED
ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 11
(1980).
APPENDIX B
THE EFFECT OF ACCRUAL TAXATION ON THE TAX BASE AND TAX
RATES
Taxing changes in the values of most assets will substantially in-
crease the tax base, which will allow a significant reduction in tax
rates. To determine the extent of the increase in the tax base, one must
determine how much the values of relevant assets can be expected to
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increase. Data collected by the Federal Reserve Board and the Internal
Revenue Service is useful for this purpose. The Federal Reserve's flow-
of-funds balance sheets19 provide data on asset holdings. Table 702 of
the balance sheets reflects changes in the level of household "financial
assets" (line 11), 2° which includes individuals' equities in noncorporate
businesses21 and excludes homes22 and consumer durables. As ex-
plained in Appendix A, most debt is recorded by the Federal Reserve at
book value and must be corrected to reflect market value. Because the
proposed accrual system would tax pension savings (line 30 of table
702)23 directly, rather than attributing them to particular individuals, I
identify them specially in my calculations.
Annual increases in the level of financial assets held by individuals
overstate the increases in the values of assets that would be taxed under
the accrual system because they include new savings. Data on savings
can be found in quarterly reports of the Federal Reserve that are sum-
marized annually in the Economic Report of the President.24 For pur-
poses of this Article, one must subtract from any increase in the level of
financial assets the total financial savings of individuals (identifying
specially any savings in pension reserves). One must also reduce the
increase by net investment in noncorporate business assets, less the net
increase in debt other than mortgage and consumer debt.25 My analysis
of adjusted Federal Reserve data for the years 1961-1984 reveal that
the average annual increase in asset values in that period was 4.4%
(4.8% if pension reserves are excluded).26
19 See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 1.
20 See id. at 16 table 702.
21 These net figures reflect results from the farm and nonfarm, noncorporate bal-
ance sheets of the Federal Reserve. See id. at 26-35 tables 703 & 704. The underlying
data in those balance sheets must be adjusted, as explained in Appendix A.
22 Vacation homes are included under owner-occupied homes. If an individual
lives in one unit of a multi-family home and rents out the other units, the owner's unit
is recorded as an owner-occupied dwelling and the rental units are included under
noncorporate businesses. Telephone interview with Elizabcth Fogler, Flow of Funds
Section, Federal Reserve Board (Dec. 3, 1985).
22 See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 1, at 16 table 702.
24 See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 263 table B-26 (1985) (Sav-
ings by individuals, 1946-1984); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SyS.,
FLow OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS, SECOND QUARTER 1985: ANNUAL REVISIONS (1985)
[hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REVISIONS]. For purposes of the calculations in this Ap-
pendix, the ANNUAL REVISIONS figures are used in preference to the figures in the
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, since the September 1985 ANNUAL REVI-
SIONS figures are consistent with the October 1985 Balance Sheet figures that have
been used. See FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEETS, supra note 1; R. GOLDSMITH,
supra note 2.
25 As explained in the text, see supra text accompanying note 210, the accrual
system would exclude houses and changes in the values of home mortgages.
25 For my analysis of the Federal Reserve data generally, see Appendix A.
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This average increase in asset values can be used to calculate the
increase in the tax base that an accrual tax system would have pro-
duced in the years 1961-1982.27 In determining the increase in the tax
base, one must take account of the amount of capital gain, net of losses,
already reported on tax returns (taking into account the deduction cur-
rently granted under section 1202 of the Code28 for certain net long-
term capital gains). One must also adjust for gains reported on assets
other than capital assets. These amounts are reported in publications of
the Internal Revenue Service.2" An analysis of that data shows that the
tax base would have been increased by 21.2% in 1961-1982 (20.8% if
pension reserves are excluded from the base)."0
These data suggest that tax rates could be reduced by a little more
than one-sixth with no loss of revenue if accrued gains were included in
the tax base. Because higher-income taxpayers realize disproportionate
amounts of gains in property, 3' one would expect the increased tax base
to be taxed disproportionately when compared to total current income.
Accordingly, decreasing the tax rates by one-sixth is a conservative
approach.
The Treasury's 1984 Report to the President and the President's
1985 tax reform proposals indicate that a tax system with three
rates-15%, 25%, and 35%-could raise an acceptable amount of taxes
compared to the current system as long as the tax base is correspond-
ingly expanded. 2 It has been shown that the Treasury Report's propo-
sal is equivalent to a revenue gain from base adjustments of $56 bil-
lion.33 The income figures that come from the Federal Reserve survey
27 I could not extend the calculation beyond 1982 because data on tax collections
for 1983 and 1984 are not yet available.
28 See I.R.C. § 1202 (1982).
29 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STATIS-
TICS OF INCOME, 1982: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS (1984).
-0 See id.
21 For example, in 1982, total net long term capital gain in excess of net short
term capital loss was 4.6% of total adjusted gross income for all taxpayers. For taxpay-
ers with adjusted gross income in excess of $200,000, the figure was 49.6%. See id. at
44, 47 table 1.4. If gains are adjusted for inflation, the disproportion is even more
dramatic. See, e.g., Feldstein & Slemrod, Inflation and the Excess Taxation of Capital
Gains on Corporate Stock, in INFLATION, TAX RATES, AND CAPITAL FORMATION
101, 105 table 7.1 (M. Feldstein ed. 1983).
22 1 UNITED STATES TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH viii, 37-39 (1984), reprinted in 71 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) No. 52, at vii, 37-39 (Nov. 27, 1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY PROPO-
SAL] (8.5% reduction in tax collections from individuals); THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PRO-
POSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 3 (1985) [here-
inafter cited as PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS] (7% reduction).
22 R. Musgrave, Getting from Here to There-Is It Worth It?, paper prepared
for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's Conference on "The Economic Consequences
of Tax Simplification" 12 (Oct. 2-4, 1985) (copy on file with University of Pennsylva-
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discussed in Part III of the text exceed federal taxable income because
they disregard itemized deductions such as those for mortgage interest
(which reduces tax collections by $25 billion), consumer interest ($15
billion), charitable contributions ($12 billion), and state and local taxes
($32 billion), a total of $84 billion.34 Accordingly, one can assume that
the rates suggested by the Treasury and the President, when applied to
the incomes shown in the Federal Reserve study, will produce a system
that does not understate tax collections when compared to current law.
Reducing the rates in the Treasury's and the President's proposals by
about one-sixth yields a system with three rates-12.5%, 21% and 29%.
Using the income brackets from the Treasury's Report, 5 one can con-
struct the following tax rate table:
Tax Rates Under Accrual System
Single Returns Head of Household Joint Returns
Taxable Taxable Taxable
Income Income Income
($OOOs) Rate ($OOOs) Rate ($OOOs) Rate
<2.8 0% <3.5 0% <3.8 0%
2.8-19.3 12.5% 3.5-25 12.5% 3.8-31.8 12.5%
19.3-38.1 21% 25-48 21% 31.8-63.8 21%
>38.1 29% >48 29% >63.8 29%
The adjusted data on assets and liabilities from the Federal Re-
serve balance sheets can also be used to calculate the effects of adjusting
the tax base for inflation. Using the GNP deflator to measure inflation,
one finds that compensating for inflation would decrease the expanded
base by about 21.25%.36
Of course, the figures above should not be taken as precise calcula-
tions of the effects on the tax base of accrual taxation or of compensat-
ing for inflation. Any major change in the tax law would have effects
on the values of assets that would ideally be taken into account in cal-
culating the consequences of the change.37 Although this observation
nia Law Review).
34 The figures on tax savings came from OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, SPECIAL ANALYSES, 1985, at G-38 to G-42 (Special Analysis G, table G-1)
(1985).
35 See 1 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 32, at xvi table S-1. The President's
proposal has slightly different brackets. See PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS, supra note
32, at 13.
"' See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 24, at 236 table B-3
(indicating GNP deflator).
" See, e.g., C. BALLARD, D. FULLERTON, J. SHOVEN, & J. WHALLEY, A GEN-
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suggests that the changes in the tax base might not be as great as calcu-
lated, the effect of accrual taxation on tax collections is likely to be
greater than the figures suggest because the affected assets are held dis-
proportionately by high income taxpayers."' Thus, it is reasonable to
suppose that the calculations presented here and the calculations based
on them in Appendix C provide a reasonable indication of the effects
the proposed change would have on tax collections.
APPENDIX C
DETERMINING ALLOWABLE ASSET HOLDINGS FOR TAXPAYERS
WITH POTENTIAL LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS
As explained in the text, this Article uses certain assumptions to
determine whether taxpayers with less than 5% liquid assets would be
likely to suffer serious liquidity problems. 9 First, it has been assumed
that taxpayers would be able to pay tax liabilities at the level of current
law without liquidity problems. In Appendix B, I show that tax rates
could be cut by about one-sixth under an accrual tax system. Accord-
ingly, taxpayers can be expected to pay an additional one-fifth of the
tax liability calculated by applying the reduced rates to the income re-
ported in the survey discussed in Part III, which roughly approximates
taxable income. This additional amount could be applied to pay a tax
on the appreciation of their assets.
Moreover, taxpayers with large amounts of appreciating assets
could be expected to allot some small portion of their incomes (deter-
mined under current law) to pay a new tax on appreciation. I have
assumed, conservatively, that taxpayers with incomes below $10,000
could pay an additional 2% of their incomes in taxes, that those with
incomes from $10,000 to $50,000 could pay 4%, and that those with
incomes above $50,000 could pay 6%. Once I determine the amount
that taxpayers could use to pay an additional tax on the appreciation of
their assets, it becomes possible to determine the value of the illiquid
assets these taxpayers could own, under different assumptions regard-
ing appreciation, and not face liquidity problems. These assumptions
have been applied to the survey data collected by the Federal Reserve.
ERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR TAX POLICY EVALUATION 242 (1985) (suggesting
the need for dynamic rather than static models for tax reform); Strnad, Taxation of
Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1103
(1985) ("Transactional analysis as traditionally practiced ignores these effects [on the
values of particular investments] ....
I See supra note 31.
31 See supra text accompanying notes 229-35.
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The results are summarized in table C-1.40
To understand the mechanics a little better, consider the entry in
the table for the income class $20,000-25,000. Except in the case of
taxpayers earning more than $50,000, in which I always use actual
income figures in making my calculations, I assume a single, midpoint
income for all members of a class. In this case, I assume $22,500 of
income. Taxpayers filing a joint return with $22,500 of taxable income
under the reduced tax rates of Appendix B would owe $2,337.50 of
tax.41 An additional one-fifth of this amount, or $467.50, would be
available for tax payments since, as explained above, that is the addi-
tional amount that would presumably have been paid under current
law.
In addition, I assume that the taxpayers would be able to devote
4% of their income, or $900, to additional tax payments. Thus, the
taxpayers would have a total of $1,367.50 available for tax payments
without facing liquidity problems. This figure is equal to the additional
tax on $228,360 of assets under a 4.5% rate of appreciation. It is also
the tax assuming 13% appreciation on $79,048 of assets or assuming
25% appreciation on $41,105 of assets.
Tables C-2, C-3, and C-4 use the results in table C-1 to determine
actual liquidity problems among the respondents in the survey. In the
case of respondents with more than $50,000 of income, a separate com-
putation has been made for each respondent to determine the precise
amount of assets that they might have under this analysis.
40 In constructing this table, I use the tax tables for married taxpayers filing
jointly. The large majority of respondents in the survey fall into this category. Making
this assumption in all cases does not bias the results one way or another. It is true that
taxpayers filing joint returns pay taxes at lower rates than others, and so could tolerate
additional appreciation recorded on their tax returns with less of a tax cost than other
taxpayers. On the other hand, as I have explained in this Appendix, one factor I use to
determine cash available to taxpayers to pay a tax on appreciation is the amount of tax
that taxpayers would have paid under current rates. Because taxpayers filing joint re-
turns pay less tax than others at the same income level, this factor tends to reduce the
amount of assets that taxpayers filing joint returns could own without liquidity
problems. Consequently, for some income groups, joint filers could hold more assets
than others; for other groups, they could hold less.
41 I have made no attempt to adjust the figures for such items as personal
deductions.
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